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ONCE again the civilized world, and particularly that portion of it in armed alliance against the Central Powers, have reason to be thankful for the superb leadership of the President of the United States. Mr. Wilson has seized the opportunity offered by Russian peace negotiations with the Central Powers and the essentially equivocal and treacherous answer returned to the Russians by the German and Austrian governments to publish the frankest, the most uncompromising and the most inspiring statement of war aims which has yet issued from any belligerent. In the President's latest statement, the ambiguities and the inadequacies of Lloyd George's recent speech vanish and are replaced with a program for a settlement of the fundamental issues of the war, which is based on a correct diagnosis of our international maladies and which is infused with the red blood of a binding, a healing and a leavening faith. His new message embodies not only the kind of statesmanship which has the best chance of compensating the world for its losses and sufferings of the last few years, but it is in addition an essentially fighting utterance, which will help to disorganize our most dangerous enemy and to keep the support of a hesitating but indispensable friend. He challenges German liberalism either to repudiate the duplicity of the German government or to show cause why their enemies should consider their wishes or respect their professions. He extends to the Russian seekers after peace the most generous recognition of the disinterestedness of their purposes and the value of their coöperation. Thus he not only sketches the essentials of a "strong peace," but weakens the forces opposed to such a peace and gives new courage to the forces which are making in its favor. Rarely in the history of the world have words been used with such startling effect to cleanse the nations of obstructive and sinister obstacles to the fulfilment of its better purposes and to charge the hearts of men with a victorious hope and a living faith.

THE significance of Mr. Lloyd George's last speech upon war aims cannot be understood unless we bear in mind the circumstances and place of its delivery. It was spoken not in the House of Commons but at a meeting of labor union delegates, assembled in Central Hall, Westminster, which had been called to consider the government's proposal for a revision of certain arrangements made early during the war about the mobilization of the man power of the country. The unions had required as one condition of a revision of their treaty with the government a re-statement of the war aims of the British Commonwealth, which would clear up existing ambiguities and relieve those aims of any taint of imperialism. The government accepted this condition, and a series of consultations was held for the purpose of reaching a statement which would embody as far as possible a common British program. The result is on the whole a remarkably satisfactory document. Mr. Lloyd George chose his words with the utmost care, because his formulas frequently had to cover varying points of view, whose differences one from an-

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other could not immediately be ironed out. This fact explained many of the less satisfactory passages of his statement. Still, in spite of these drawbacks, Mr. Lloyd George in making this kind of speech has conceded the essential point for which liberal opinion in England has been contending for the past three years. He has officially sought a basis for the future moral unity of the British people, not in a blind victory over the enemy achieved at any price, but in a frank statement of the specific political purposes for the benefit of which a victory will be used. This concession is a decisive triumph for the essentially liberal point of view about questions of war and peace, and it has had the effect, as liberals have always claimed, not of impairing the national morale but of improving it.

IT is not only, however, the British trades unions which must be credited with this triumph of British opinion. Much of the credit for the Lloyd George speech must be ascribed to the Marquis of Lansdowne, who broke with the traditions of his own class and insisted upon a new statement of war aims. His demand was supported by such a large percentage of opinion in the press and among public men that the government, reluctant as it was to abandon its former attitude, was obliged to give in. The whole incident forms an excellent illustration of the political good sense of the British people and of their ability slowly but still surely to learn the obvious lessons of their own experience. Unmistakably it also forms an equally illuminating illustration of the reactionary stupidity of the American press and of American politicians in discussing the problems of the war. The Lansdowne letter was greeted in this country with an almost unanimous chorus of condemnation, which strangely contrasted with the attitude of our English associates. Yet Lord Lansdowne was only repeating a demand which President Wilson had made a year earlier, and which the President had in his management of American foreign policy complied with again and again. It is one of the strange and sinister anomalies of the politics of today that the statesman who has done most of all to liberalize the issues of the great war, and to secure the acceptance of his own liberalism throughout the world should be so profoundly misunderstood and so unintelligently supported by the most articulate of his own fellow-countrymen. The great majority of American newspapers are possessed by a spirit of romantic patriotic militarism, which has hindered them from grasping the realities of the revolution which is taking place in the political ideals and methods of the European democracies.

A GOOD illustration of this misunderstanding is afforded by the surly comment of the New York Tribune on the Lloyd George speech. The British Premier should never have had to utter the speech and the mistake of uttering it should not be repeated. But it will be repeated in spite of the Tribune's prohibition, and the repetition of these war aims speeches will constitute an indispensable means of bringing the war to a successful conclusion. Such utterances are an essential aspect of the democratic control over the foreign policy of nations for which among other things America is fighting. They constitute a necessary instrument of the new "daylight diplomacy" which liberalism throughout the world is seeking to substitute for the old secret diplomacy. By means of this public statement the nations now at war will gradually recover the ability to communicate one with another, so that when they actually assemble at a peace conference some kind of a preliminary understanding will have been reached. The Lloyd George speech possesses the great virtue of removing a few of the graver obstacles to an ultimate agreement, but many grave obstacles still remain. Many months of fighting and many additional similar declarations will be needed to remove them. The people and the conditions which persuaded Lloyd George to undertake the public revision of the war aims of Great Britain will persuade him and other statesmen to repeat the manoeuver whenever a good occasion offers. In no other way can a war be successfully waged which has become a competition in morales. In no other way can the present war be won. Lloyd George is not substituting words for armies as a weapon of victory. He is only supplementing the contest of armies in which the strongest battalions win with a contest of moral and political purposes, in which victory should run with the better cause.

WHAT is the meaning of Mr. Lloyd George's declaration as to Alsace-Lorraine? Some of our newspaper headlines have made him promise that England would fight to the death for the restoration of the lost provinces to France. Is that what he intended to promise? Here is what he said: "We mean to stand by the French democracy to the death in the demand they make for a reconsideration of the great wrong of 1871, when, without regard to the wishes of the population, two French provinces were torn from the side of France and incorporated in the German Empire." These words are both an unconditional assertion that the status of Alsace and Lorraine must be reconsidered and also an implicit promise, just as binding as if it were explicit, that the reconsideration must issue in an arrangement satisfactory to

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France. When the time comes to lay all cards on the table, then France may demand either a return of the whole of Alsace and the whole of Lorraine, the return of part of each, or a plebiscite. Whatever the demand may be, England binds herself to support it. What she does not do, what Mr. Lloyd George carefully refrains from doing, is to define at this moment the French demand. No wise French statesman, no wise friend of France can ask more than Mr. Lloyd George has promised.

DISINTEGRATION of the Dual Empire is no part of Lloyd George's war program. He declares, not for the absolute independence of the subject nationalities, but for " genuine self-government on true democratic principles." This is quite in accord with President Wilson's policy. It is extremely disappointing to the Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav leaders who hoped for complete independence. Such a solution would nevertheless mark a tremendous advance toward Central European justice. If the Czecho-Slovak and the Jugo-Slavs enjoyed the same degree of autonomy under the Empire that the Hungarians now enjoy, they would be able, like the Hungarians, to work out the greater part of their cultural mission and prepare themselves for the complete independence that they will be able to maintain when the world has been made really safe for small nations. It may be said that national autonomy within the Dual Empire is at present as difficult to attain as independence. But this would be to ignore the very great progress toward national organization that has occurred under the pressure of war. German-Magyar ascendency in the Dual Empire is already tottering, and wise diplomacy on the part of the Allies may be expected to lead to a reorganization of the Empire that will leave it much less of an incubus to its peoples, much less of a menace to the peace of Europe, than it has hitherto been.

THE principle of self-determination of nationalities is not in the least infringed by Lloyd George's proposal as to the disposition of Turkey. Arabia, Syria, Palestine, Armenia and Mesopotamia are not so much Turkish as were Macedonia and Thrace before the Balkan wars. The Turk has been for these territories only an overlord, with no other function than exploitation. His expulsion would mean nothing more than the extinction of privileges that the modern world can not tolerate. It is even to his own ultimate gain. Turkish nationality is not compatible with Turkish imperialism. Anatolia, the real seat of Turkish national life, has been drained generation after generation of its able leaders and brave men by the requirements of governing an extended empire over alien races. In the circumstances, it was impossible for either the Turkish nation or the nations under the Turkish yoke to make any substantial contribution to the world's culture. Lloyd George proclaims an end of the pernicious system of Turkish imperialism. He does not proclaim the forcible annexation by the western Powers of the territories from which Turkey is to be expelled. The degree in which they are to be accorded protection by European Powers, whether in severalty or joined in a league, is left to the determination of the peace conference. Against such a plan not even the Germans can seriously protest. They can not afford to lengthen the war for a single day for the sake of continuing the Turkish charter of oppression.

ECONOMIC war after the war still retains a trace of vitality in Lloyd George's statement of war aims. " It is inevitable that those countries which have control of raw material will desire to help themselves and their friends first." As indicated in an article by Sidney Webb published in this issue, the predominant factor in international trading relations after the war—at least so far as concerns European nations—will be the procuring of imported materials. If Germany is to be the object of hostile discrimination in this respect, her chances of speedy economic recovery are limited. It is possible, of course, that Lloyd George presents this threat of economic war merely as an offset to the equally irreconcilable German demand for the restoration of the German colonies. Colonies mean to Germany nothing but raw materials, and German statesmen are not likely to overlook the fact that even without the support of her allies, Britain could cut off from Germany vastly more important sources of raw materials than the German colonies afford. It is also possible that Lloyd George means to be interpreted literally as declaring that whatever happens at the peace conference, the British and their western European allies mean to adopt an economic policy of reciprocal preference in all that pertains to essential supplies. The practical difficulty such a policy would encounter is that neither the United States nor Russia can be expected to organize their export to discriminate in favor of friends. Those two nations, together with the lesser neutral states, would afford ample opportunity for German trade recovery.

HOW thoroughgoing is the work which preceded the reorganization of the Ordnance Bureau will never be known by the public, largely because the public never knew how like chaos the bureau was at the beginning. What has happened is more fundamental than a sudden convulsion due to public criticism, though doubtless the pressure

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of publicity hastened and made easier the final changes. Brigadier General Wheeler, the new acting chief, has the confidence of many former critics of the bureau. Under him the organization is essentially right. A procurement division negotiates all orders and contracts, and is headed by an able business man and recent civilian, Colonel Samuel McRoberts, formerly executive manager of the National City Bank of New York. A production division, which follows up orders and applies the driving power, will be headed by a civilian. The inspection division is properly kept under military leadership, as is the supply division, which has charge of distributing the finished products to the army. These four divisions supplant five independent and illogically planned divisions, which in the past multiplied confusion. The new bureau, like the French and British Ministries of Munitions, places the control of production where it belongs, under civilian business men. It accomplishes a reform that is necessary, whether a separate Department of Supplies is established, or one is developed under Secretary Baker.

THE newspapers like to comment on women conductors and women messengers, and other women picturesquely out of their sphere. There is less entertainment perhaps in the unmentioned fact that these women are being exploited because they do not come under the protection of existing factory laws. This is an evil bound to increase unless it is fought immediately. For that reason the Women's Trade Union League of New York is calling a public conference on January 12 and 13 to discuss the maintenance of labor standards during the war and the need for additional protective legislation. The conference is of importance not only to New York but to all the states. Its proceedings will give valuable information to those who are concerned about the large problem of women in war industries.

Aid and Comfort from Russia

A CONSIDERABLE, perhaps a decisive, improvement has taken place during the last week in the chance possessed by the United States and its European associates of winning the war. In fact they are practically certain of winning it, provided only they seize and use with the utmost effect the weapons which good fortune has placed in their hands. The improvement has taken place, not as a consequence of a victory by any of the Allied armies, not even because of any more efficient and economical adaptation of their industrial and military mechanism to the object of defeating the enemy. It has taken place because of the policy of the Bolshevik Russian government in submitting the sincerity of the pretended German desire for a just and lasting settlement of the war to the test of a complete and definite public exposure. Because of the Russian "peace offensive," the essential duplicity and the actual imperialistic agressiveness of the war aims, which the German government was hiding under an apparent adhesion to the "no annexations and no indemnities" formula, have been laid bare in all their ugly depravity. That government proposes not only to dominate eastern Europe by splitting up Russia, but to use the pretence of popular approval in territory under military occupation as an excuse for annexing the territory. There can be only one answer to this flagrantly hypocritical attempt to make a victorious war of conquest dance to the soothing tune of a peace of reconciliation. It is the answer returned so far by the Bolsheviki themselves. Rather than accept anything like these terms, the enemies of Germany should resist as long as they have any means of resistance left.

Dissenters will inquire why this exposure should be considered a great victory for the Allies. Did not all sane men know that nothing could come out of Germany save duplicity and poisonous offenses against the security of nations and international good faith? Why prove over again a truth which is already proved up to the hilt? Surely the answer is sufficiently obvious. As the war dragged along it became to an increasing extent a competition in morales. It was exhausting the resources, straining the wills and intensifying the sufferings of the civilian populations in all the belligerent countries. Germany was the first belligerent to use this general and increasing popular mental attitude towards the war for her own political advantage. Beginning in December, 1916, she sought to consolidate the fighting spirit at home and weaken it abroad by a "peace offensive," which would place the responsibility for continuing the war on her enemies. President Wilson broke the force of the first assault by asking the belligerents to define their war aims and by securing a partly satisfactory statement from the Allies and a wholly unsatisfactory one from Germany. Because of his intervention the German government by its first overture in the new diplomacy only succeeded in increasing the fighting spirit of its enemies and undermining that of its own people. Opposition to the government began to find insistent expression in the Reichstag, the majority of which finally secured a reluctant and ambiguous renunciation of military conquests from its own government. Then a new offensive started. Because they had pretended to renounce conquests, whereas the Allies had not, and because they used fair words about disarmament and a peace of rec-

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onciliation, the Germans were hoping to divide Russia from the Allies, and partly to divide the Italian, French and British governments from the Socialist parties. During the course of the offensive the Allied governments did nothing to check its force. Of course they asserted and denounced the hypocrisy of the Germans, but the American government apart, they refused to engage the German government in its own field of political propaganda. They were risking the success of the Allied cause exclusively on the effectiveness of the military weapon. They did nothing to prevent the alienation of the Russian republic and they did nothing to reassure those among their own citizens who felt doubtful about the justifiability of the war aims of some of the Allies.

That the Allied governments escaped from this situation without loss was due to the despised and condemned Bolsheviki. The Russians, despairing of any other way of meeting the increasing difficulties of their internal situation opened peace negotiations with Germany. It was a drastic measure, which aroused not unnaturally deep resentment in the west, but it was successful in one salient respect. It has thrown a flood of light on the war aims of the belligerents. They have dragged the duplicity and the aggressive imperialistic purposes of the German government into the light of day. They have, consequently, furnished the hesitating proletarian population of the Allied nations with an object in fighting, which not even an American Socialist could consistently repudiate, and this augmentation of moral unity and determination in the Allied nations will be accompanied by an increasing dissension, both in Germany and between Germany and her allies. There are many people in Germany, there are relatively more in Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria, who want peace and who want to begin negotiations for peace on a basis of objects and principles which will bear public inspection. As a result of the exposure of the actual purposes, which the German government is concealing behind its smooth words, one of two things must happen. Either the opposition to the government will be powerful enough to obtain further concessions and to substitute for the present Chancellor and Foreign Secretary new men, who are capable of acting in good faith, or else German liberalism will have to abandon any pretence of influencing German national policy. Unless the government withdraws from its present indefensible position we may look forward confidently during the present winter not only to a strengthening of the power of moral endurance among the enemies of Germany, but to a growing disintegration of morale within the German nation and among its associates.

Many people seem to expect that the Russians will answer the German peace proposal by discontinuing negotiations and resuming war against Germany. If they did, their action would be of doubtful benefit to the Allied cause. As a consequence of the utter disorganization in Russia, the troops of that country cannot be of much use in conducting a military offensive against Germany. But Russian diplomacy can be of inestimable value in conducting a political offensive. A Russia once more in arms would tend to tie the German nation together and unite it more firmly with Austria-Hungary. A Russia which is honestly negotiating for a democratic general peace, and which refuses either to accept anything less and, failing that, to resume amicable relations with Germany, will do more injury to German autocracy than the former Russian army. Its ability to damage Germany is wholly dependent, of course, on the military resistance Germany is meeting in the west. The French and British armies are now protecting the Russians from the consequences of their own helplessness. But no less is it true that the Russians with no weapons but their bare hands and their vehicles of publicity are providing indispensable assistance to the French, British and American nations in their armed struggle to secure a just and lasting peace. We cannot imagine a combination of physical and moral forces, which is more likely to overcome the resistance of the Central Powers and their people than the combination which is now being brought against them. In the west and on the sea the Central Powers are confronted with a steady increase of military and naval power, which is inexorably determined to deny a military victory to them, but which repudiates all aggressive designs against them. In the east they are confronted with a nation of 180,000,000 people which cannot fight, but which refuses to consent to an undemocratic settlement, and which holds the hope of a decent and honorable but not a victorious peace before the eyes of the German people. The German morale cannot survive this double attack throughout another year unless it is much stouter than it looks to be.

If victory is to be won, this double attack, this combined military and political offensive must be continued. The Russians cannot be of much assistance to the western Allies in defeating the German army, but the western Allies can be of great assistance to the Russians in their assault on the German morale. That they are increasingly alive to this opportunity is indicated in part by the British Premier's war aims speech, which unlike many of his previous speeches tended to intensify resistance to Germany among the Allied nations and to diminish resistance within Germany and Austria to the Allied attack. But in one important respect Mr. Lloyd George still fell short of doing all that is

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needed to strengthen the combined military and political offensive. He persisted in treating the Bolshevik Russian government as an international outcast, which was forfeiting the right to any consideration on the part of the western Allies. He should have recognized how far France, Great Britain and Italy were responsible for the Russian defection and what an excellent chance there is of recovering Russia for the Allies by more considerate and sympathetic treatment. Doubtless the Allied governments will in time see the necessity of adopting this course, but why should their diplomacy, like their military preparation, always be "too late"? The reversal in policy of which Lloyd George's war aims speech was a clear symptom came "too late" to prevent the loss of the Russian army, such as it had become, to the Allied cause. In spite of this delay, the Russian nation still seems safe for the Allies as long as the German government pursues its present insensate policy, but if the Germans should ever honestly accept the Russian peace formula, the Allies might discover to their consternation that they had really and irretrievably lost Russia. If that event happens it would warrant a final repetition of the cry "too late," more calamitous than any which has yet been uttered.

The developments of the past few weeks have vindicated the policy for which The New Republic has been arguing, and for which it has been so unintelligently criticized. Ever since last May the temper of the Russian revolution and its inability to combine a military offensive with the preservation of its own peculiar moral and spiritual vitality has become increasingly clear. At that time we began to argue that this attitude of the Russian revolutionists altered the whole political and military situation and should be allowed to determine the diplomatic policy of the Allies. Although it diminished their ability to secure a military victory over Germany, it could be used so as to increase their ability to obtain a political victory. We urged, consequently, the attempt to reach a better understanding with the Russian revolution and the use of that understanding as the basis for a political offensive against the already weakening moral endurance of the German and Austrian civil population. But although a similar policy was urged by the French Socialists and the British Labor party, the Allied governments, with the partial exception of the United States, persisted in treating the Russian republic as a dead loss and refused to take any step either to reach a better understanding with its rulers or to use its ideals as a political asset. Although the Russians tried repeatedly to obtain a statement of Allied war aims, modified to meet the change in the situation produced by their own revolution and American entrance into the war, they were answered with one rebuff after another, until in desperation they forced a "show-down" by opening peace negotiations. The "show-down" has taken place, and it has been worth what The New Republic has persistently claimed it would be worth—that is, a substantial increase of strength to the cause of the Allies. That cause needs to be defended no less than formerly by armies, and now less than ever do we suggest a relaxation of military preparation and military pressure on Germany, but just because the cause of the Allies is righteous its success can and ought to be promoted by calling moral and political forces to its assistance. This view seems by way of being adopted. The "political offensive" against Germany and Austria is gathering headway and will in the end obtain an irresistible momentum.

A Council of State

BEFORE the United States entered the war The New Republic frequently called attention to the excessive burden which the political and economic developments of recent years were accumulating on the President. The assumption of new functions by the federal government, combined with the inexorable growth of administration at the expense of legislation, has enormously increased his executive responsibilities. The sudden emergence of the nation from the isolation of over a century, and its participation in world politics, increased enormously the amount of attention which was called for by his practically exclusive responsibility for initiating and carrying out a foreign policy. Finally the inability of the Senate and the House of Representatives to represent national as distinguished from a combination of local interests was compelling the President to assume a similar initiative in domestic legislation. In the meantime nothing was being done to distribute the exercise of his multifarious and overwhelming burden of political duties. President Wilson managed skilfully to induce Congress to work for him, but no steps were taken to enable its leaders to work with him and share some of his labors. Neither did the Cabinet as an institution show any symptoms of growth. The several secretaries remained essentially executive clerks, who were without independent authority or collective prestige. The enormous increase in presidential power continued to be purely personal in the way it operated and in the resulting concentration of responsibility. No one man could play so many parts acceptably, and no national executive could accumulate so much authority without eventually being involved in a contest with the national legislature.

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When the United States entered the war, the already enormous power and responsibility of the President were indefinitely magnified. In addition to the increasing burden of his captaincy of the army, navy and diplomatic service, in addition to the need of quickly deciding on a comprehensive program of war legislation, Congress made him responsible for the distribution of food and fuel, the regulation of foreign trade and the efficiency of the transportation service. Of course, he exercised these additional powers through subordinates, but there remained a large element of purely presidential responsibility and exercise of power. How the President manages to master the information and make the decisions which these exacting and multifarious duties impose upon him is really a mystery. The inability of his fellow-countrymen to grasp it contributes to the impression of superhumanity and inscrutability which to an increasing extent he is making on the average American.

As a matter of fact, some part of the power imparted to him is not exercised and some part of the work is not accomplished. In another column Mr. William Hard calls attention to the grave difficulties which are involved by the existing method of organizing the war activities of the nation. In the case of every phase of the President's complicated task there are matters of general policy, which cannot be decided by departmental chiefs; and many of these matters involve inter-departmental relations which demand a great deal of joint consultation. In spite of all attempts to organize war councils of one kind or another to deal with such questions, the President himself continues to be the only war council whose deliberations or decisions are of living importance. The consequence is that, sound and alert as his judgment ultimately is, decisions are necessarily delayed and action is frequently not taken until a crisis in some particular phase of war work forces the matter on the President's attention and precipitates a decision.

Mr. Hard suggests a way out of the difficulty. He asks the President to organize a supreme War Council, to attend its deliberations and to place upon this council the responsibility for deciding questions of general policy and planning the war. The advice is, in our opinion, sound. No council could do away with the ultimate difficulty which cannot be avoided as long as the quality of Mr. Wilson's official and unofficial power remains so purely personal. The President is a legal dictator, but he is the dictator of a country without any of the institutions of subservience. Nevertheless, a supreme war council with the President at the head of the table would provide a rough temporary remedy for the worst of the delays which are now compromising the efficiency of American war preparation. It would bring into existence an institution which would distribute some of the President's responsibility and diminish the congestion, which the concentration of so much power in one man renders to a certain extent inevitable.

The President should be willing to take some such advice. In the days when he was analyzing American political institutions he showed full understanding of the need of balancing an increase of executive power with some more effective machinery of "common counsel," which as he then believed was to be derived from an increasingly close association with Congress, but unfortunately a movement in that direction seems impracticable just now. There seems to be no way in which the President can obtain the needed assistance, save through the organization of a war council, from whose meetings the President would never be absent, and which, like the English war council, would keep a record of its proceedings. Such a body would not have any statutory authority, and probably it would not survive the war, but at least it would serve a manifest and an immediate need, and it would afford a test of the value in peace of one obvious way of organizing and distributing some of the President's congested personal power. Mr. Wilson has proved himself to be so great a man in his handling of the ultimate issues of the war and in his general direction of American internal policy that he can afford to put into commission some of the power to make minor but still important decisions. If he does not do so, additional mistakes will be made as serious as the delay of the ship-building program and of the assumption of railroad control by the government. The consequence of the repetition of such mistakes might be serious both to the success of American war policy and to the morale of the country.

Making the Most of Railway Control

ONE can scarcely recall a single important administrative act that was received with such universal approval as the President's proclamation taking over the railways. The railway presidents represent themselves as pleased and relieved. The attitude of the railway investors is established beyond dispute by the advance in railway shares. Railway labor is satisfied, and promises to coöperate loyally toward the success of the enterprise. Shippers are confident that their transportation requirements will be supplied, and the general public no longer fears that frequent fuel and food famines will mark our progress toward national organization for war. Go where you will,

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you will hear only one complaint directed against the President's action, and that is that it was unnecessarily delayed. There is hardly anybody who does not believe that under national control the railways will meet more successfully the requirements of the country at war.

In only one point of policy is there serious difference of opinion. For how long a period should national control be continued? Many who look with distrust upon anything savoring of public ownership insist that government control should be limited to the period of the war. Many who are convinced that government ownership is the only proper solution of the railway problem would prefer to see government action based upon the premise that the railways will never return to private control. For our own part, while we believe that government ownership must come, and are convinced that the sooner government ownership is established the better, we admit the expediency of shaping our present legislation in such a way as to leave the question open for a final determination after the war. We are not adherents of the doctrine that in all matters of domestic policy the nation ought to mark time, but we recognize that the success of our war-time policy of railway control depends so largely upon the coöperation of the railway managers and railway laborers, most of whom are averse to government ownership, that they are entitled to carry their case before the people in time of peace, without the prejudice of the accomplished fact. Nevertheless, we should regard it as extremely unfortunate if Congress were to limit government operation to the period of the war.

What were, in essence, the causes of the failure in railway management that forced us to the adoption of a policy of national control? In the first place, the great dislocation of traffic that was involved in the mobilization of men and industry for war. It was this dislocation that made imperative a more thoroughgoing pooling of equipment and facilities than the private railways, each with its own particular interests to guard, were able to make. In the second place, the operation of the railways as separate units entailed competitive costs that a country with resources mortgaged to the war could not afford to meet. And in the third place, the requirements of the railways for new capital could not well be provided for in a market swept bare by government loans.

It would be absurd to assume that the conclusion of peace will at once restore the conditions under which competitive railway operation has proved at least tolerably satisfactory. We shall have problems of demobilization equal in magnitude to the problems of mobilization, except that time will be a somewhat less serious consideration. We shall need all our capital and energy for the work of reconstruction, and this means that we shall not be able to afford the wastes of railway competition. We may safely surmise that the financial market at the close of the war will not be favorable to the flotation of large corporation loans. Government securities will be widely held in every country now at war, and the habit of investment in such securities will naturally be more or less fixed. Corporation securities will only gradually recover their place in the market. It seems probable, therefore, that the railways will need the support of government credit to obtain cheaply the immense sums that they will need in the period of reconstruction.

Whether we approve of government ownership or not, we are forced to contemplate a more or less prolonged period after the war in which the conditions will be hardly more favorable to private operation than they are at present. And this means that we ought to count upon several years of government control ahead of us. If, in our military calculations we must assume that the war will last for two years, we should, in our railway calculations, proceed on the assumption that control will be necessary for at least five years.

It may be asked, what practical difference does it make whether we assume that control will extend through several years, or will end with the conclusion of peace. If railway control is something that we have picked up, to drop at the earliest possible moment, nothing in the way of a systematic plan of improving our railway facilities can be considered. We may build more cars and locomotives, lay a few switches, double-track a few sections of line where congestion is intolerable. Beyond this we should hardly be justified in undertaking improvements. If on the other hand railway control is to extend through several years, we are justified in devoting whatever energies we can spare to grappling with such crying evils as competitive terminal arrangements. Mr. Theodore P. Shonts is authority for the estimate that between sixty and seventy per cent of the labor and fuel used in the terminal traffic of New York could be saved by a pooling of railway properties under a common organization. Important savings could be effected in the same way in practically every large city in the country. The task is one of immense magnitude, but we can expect notable progress toward its accomplishment if we make up our minds that government railway operation is no merely temporary expedient, but an enterprise extending over a considerable time and capable of achieving permanent results.

Perhaps we shall keep the railways under national management, and perhaps we shall restore them to their private managers. In either case, it

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is in the interest of the nation as a whole that we should make our present experiment in national control contribute its utmost to the creation of a railway system fully capable of meeting the requirements of our national life.

Men to France

IF our cause is to prosper, many things are required of America. Ships, guns, munitions, food are required of us, required imperatively. But what is required above all things is men.

It would be most desirable, all agree, if American men could appear in vast armies in France, fully trained and expertly officered, equipped to the last degree of efficiency with arms large and small of American make, supplied by American-built railways from the ports to their sectors of front and by American ships plying regularly and in numbers adequate to set at defiance the most skilful plans of the German submarine strategists. This would represent a complete military machine, whose forces would in every respect mean a net addition to the Allied fighting power. It is our ideal. But such a machine can be made ready only after the lapse of much time, and time is the one thing we cannot afford to spend. Given time enough the Germans may be able to make some kind of working arrangements with the Russians that will hearten the German people with the prospect of additional food supplies. Given time enough the Germans believe that the French can be driven to a peace of weariness. This we do not believe, but that is an irrelevancy. It is the German belief that counts in prolonging the war. So long as they think they have reason for believing that French resistance can be broken, they will offer no terms that are worth a free world's acceptance.

We cannot get our perfected war machine to France in time to compel an early peace. We can get men to France very soon by the hundred thousand. Our Allies are eager to give preference in tonnage employment to the transportation of men. It is the consensus of their opinion that the common cause would be greatly advanced if we were to send straightway to France the soldiers now under training in our camps.

These troops, it may be said, are only half-trained. They are not ready to bear the brunt of German assault. True: but there cannot be the slightest doubt that their training would proceed more rapidly in France, in an atmosphere of war. Our officers are not ready to assume command of troops in the field. True: but they would advance much more rapidly in their professional skill under the eyes of British and French officers, who embody the experience of desperate warfare. We should not be able to equip our soldiers with arms of all calibres by the time they are personally fit. No matter; the equipment of a division in the trenches is not attached to the men. After one division has been under fire for as long a time as it can well endure, another division replaces it, succeeding to the use of all the heavy and light artillery, machine guns, reserve small arms. Our men can fight with British and French arms until we are ready to supply them with arms of our own make.

But this would not increase the number of men in the front line fighting the Germans. It would only mean that for part of the time American troops would man the trenches, instead of Frenchmen or British. It would not mean that more losses were inflicted on the enemy, or less losses borne by our side, but only that we took the place of our Allies in inflicting and sustaining losses. This is true, on the whole. It does not in the least reduce the significance of our aid.

There is not now and there will not for a long time be any real shortage of men to hold the lines of trenches. France and England have reserves to replace losses as they occur. They have divisions that are resting to take the place of other divisions worn out by fighting. The Germans' only hope for victory lies in the exhaustion, physically or morally, of these reserves. With large American forces in France, rapidly preparing for active service, the German hope of physical exhaustion of reserves would be vain. And with American divisions actually taking their place in the firing line, giving the overtaxed French a chance really to recuperate, the Germans could no longer count on the moral exhaustion of their foes.

To expedite the transportation of our troops to France is clearly the surest way open to us of aiding our Allies. But we are not proposing it as a means of aiding our Allies, but as a means of protecting our national interests and the international interests we have made our own. This war is our war, in the same sense that it is the war of our Allies. How the aggregate loss will be allocated if Germany wins cannot now be determined, but it is certain that the loss to the United States will be incalculable. Germany cannot win if the present lines hold until our potential resources have been transmuted into actual fighting power. Holding the present lines is our business as much as it is the business of the French and the British and the Italians. It is a condition essential to our ultimate success. Therefore it is not in keeping with the national honor that we should leave the whole burden of it to our war-worn Allies while we prepare at leisure for the ultimate decisive struggle. Pursuing such a policy, we may, in the end, find that we shall lack a field in

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which to bring our conflict with Germany to a conclusion. It would be a bitter outcome for us that left Germany, in undisputed command of the European continent, facing us threateningly across the Atlantic.

A Gift to the Republicans?

SO long as a party tradition coincides with public feeling, the basis of party action is ironclad. While the nation was indifferent to woman suffrage, it was no weakness for the Southern Democratic congressmen to form a solid core of opposition to the federal suffrage amendment. It suited their tradition, both as regards women and as regards enfranchisement. It made it unnecessary for them to act or to think.

A swift national change on woman suffrage has confounded this traditionalism. What was for a long period a core of safe and complacent junkerdom in Congress has now become the embattled front line of opposition on an issue common to both parties and full of national consequences. What was once a luxurious prejudice has now to stand fire as a positive policy, a policy of refusing the vote that has to be interpreted as national and aggressive.

It is the Republican leaders who have made the issue positive. By promising support to the federal amendment they have thrown the burden of opposition on the non-suffrage Democratic congressmen, with a full and deliberate intention of making the Democrats renounce their last obstinacy or else pay the heaviest political price. It is not as if the Democrats had Congress in their hands, nor is it as if the women had not yet eighteen states in which their electoral votes count. Whether or not the Democrats remember it, the Republicans vividly remember California in 1916, and they see good reason why the fair thing should be done by women in regard to their ultimate enfranchisement all through the United States. What they hope, cynically but legitimately, is that the Southern Democrats will fail to reckon the importance of opposing suffrage, will persist in it against the interests of their party, and will define with perfect and undisguisable clarity the incapacity of the Democratic party, as now constituted, to respond to this serious national claim.

It seems unlikely, as we go to press, that these Republican expectations will be justified. Certainly if they are justified, if the Democrats hold up the amendment, it will be on no good grounds. The grounds of Southern opposition to suffrage are manifestly not defensible in the nation at large. It will be denied, of course, that the source of this obstinacy is a lingering prejudice in favor of woman's inequality, a prejudice in favor of the principle that woman's place is on a pedestal so long as her husband can go off and safely leave her there. But the fact remains that this prejudice is fondly urged in Congress, as against every practical requirement of democracy, and is the basis of much opposition to enfranchisement; while the uneducated colored vote is the other ever-present argument on unsmiling Congressional lips. Woman, it appears, is both above and beneath voting—outside New York and seventeen other constituent parts of the nation. It is a poor fortification against the damning retort that the Democratic party, seeking the aid of women voters, positively refuses to give women the vote.

For the continued opposition of Democrats is all that can keep women from getting the federal amendment. The issue is in the hands of the Democrats in the House and the Senate. It will meet success or defeat at their hands. No one can pretend that all women voters are preoccupied with extending the franchise. No one can pretend that women whose affiliations are Democratic are all going to go against those affiliations, even if Democrats defeat the amendment. But the Democrats have no margin to play with. They won't gain votes by blocking suffrage. They are absolutely bound to lose if they do block it and to lose because of a stubborn and unreflective persistence in the archaic conviction that citizenship is still a privilege.

If citizenship is a privilege, the United States is not a democracy. The Republican leaders have had the sense to embrace a cause that is so solidly founded on this truth. Do the Democrats propose to make the Republicans a present of this principle, for utilization later on in 1918? It would be inexpedient as well as undemocratic.

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EDITORS
HERBERT CROLY — FRANCIS HACKETT
PHILIP LITTELL — ALVIN JOHNSON
GEORGE SOULE—Assistant Editor
CHARLES MERZ, Washington Representative

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The Keystone of Our Coördination

THERE is a thing that shatters all the "coördinating" so far done at Washington. That thing is that it has not included a certain person. That person is Woodrow Wilson. Till Mr. Wilson gets "coördinated," all other "coördinating" is, in a big way, vain.

We have had infinite "coördinating" in detail. The other day we observed a group of ladies packing Christmas socks for soldiers under the "coördinating" influence of the Red Cross. Into each sock they put one walnut, two sticks of candy, six peanuts and eighteen kernels of popcorn, counted. The irregular impulse which might have led to seventeen kernels of popcorn or to nineteen had been checked. It had been absorbed into a higher unity. Each lady proceeded, kernel by kernel, till she came to the eighteenth; and there, in that group and in all other such groups, obedient to a remote consolidated command, she stopped.

We are well "coördinated" on the subject of popcorn, as we are on many other subjects of no importance. From that point up, our "coördinating" gets weaker and weaker. By the time we arrive at the elevation of the minor officials in our various government departments at Washington, we are in difficulties. They confer a great deal; but, in the absence of a consolidated command, they disagree a great deal. And by the time we arrive at the top officials, even conference begins to dwindle and finally ceases.

The meetings of our Cabinet, in comparison with the meetings of any other Cabinet in the world, are extraordinarily infrequent. And Mr. Hoover and Mr. Garfield are not members of the Cabinet. Now, to be sure, they are invited to attend the meetings of the enlarged Council of National Defense. Mr. Hoover has shown that he has a certain view with regard to "priority" of food and of fuel on railways. Mr. Garfield has shown that he has a certain other view. Both those men have had reason to know, for many months, that our railway management, for national unity and rapidity, was a failure. It was well that they should be invited to attend the meetings of the council. They do attend. But Mr. McAdoo, who was issuing our government loans, who knew the money market, who knew the effect of our public finance on the private finance of our railways, and who is now our Director of Railways, has not been attending. The President's right-hand man has not been attending. And the President has not been attending.

Till Mr. Wilson is in daily attendance at meetings of the men through whom he rules, the whole government of the United States is bound to run behind schedule day after day and month after month with results—

Let us speak frankly

—with results which will be measured by the extended duties of our burial squads on European battlefields. The keystone of our coördination is today lacking. Our one need, in comparison with which all other needs are not needs at all, is to get that keystone.

Mr. Wilson, if one may judge by his acts, has a certain definite conception of the Presidency. He conceives himself to be, to begin with, an interpreter of the conscience of America. This conception, deliberately and faithfully followed, has raised him to a moral level where few of our Presidents have stood. We would not for one moment have him abate it. We are not speaking of his decisions in the field of high political policy. That this country is to be a liberal country, that it is to fight all anti-liberalism within its borders, that it is even to help to fight and to master all anti-liberalism of an internationally dangerous sort throughout the world—those decisions, those interpretations, deeply discerned and magnificently portrayed to the world's imagination, have given us in him a leader not only of our own souls but of the souls of all peoples. We would not have him cease thus to "interpret." It is one of his favorite words. He sets himself up to be an "interpreter," of high political purposes, of high moral purposes, in the bosoms of men; and he amply and movingly, world-movingly, justifies his claim.

The vice in him is that he carries this conception of "interpretation," of discernment, of secret individual discernment, over from the field of high political and moral policy into the field of concrete daily administration.

When Mr. Wilson became President, we needed a tariff commission. A tariff commission is an administrative matter, an administrative method. We needed it. But the mass of us did not know that we needed it. In the soul of the people there was no moral yearning for a tariff commission. Some time later, under the careful tutelage of certain experts in propaganda, the soul of the people was in this respect awakened. Mr. Wilson discerned the need of a tariff commission. He ordained it. Congress passed it. The soul of the people was satisfied. Along came the war. We revised certain of our tariff schedules. The soul of the people did not demand that the tariff com-

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mission be used in revising those schedules. Of course not. The soul of the people is not concerned with administrative methods, with administrative efficiencies. The man who waits for the soul of the people in such matters is destined to see his departments fail. The tariff commission failed. In the revising of those schedules it was condemned, flouted, disregarded. And Mr. Wilson was not present, day by day, among the men through whom he rules, to see to it that their functions are recognized and that their duties are concertedly and effectively performed.

It is this vice, it is this habit of administering by "interpretation" and by solitary "interpretation," that now brings us to our great war-time administrative decisions months late and then, after they are made, clogs and boggles them.

On the day when we went into the war, we needed a governmental unification of railways. The British gave their railways a governmental unification at almost the very instant of their declaration of war against Germany. We had the same need, and we had their example. But there was no general demand for unification among us; because the evils of a lack of unification had not yet generally and popularly revealed themselves. They were apparent only in prospect and only to the eye of the administrative statesman looking ahead. We let them develop. We let them develop into a congestion of traffic which not only blocked our supplies for our own population but also blocked our supplies for the war and left scores of vessels lying in our ports unable to proceed to Europe with necessary sustenance for the Allies who stand between us and military destruction. And then, only then, an appalling tangle having resulted, and great popular distress and indignation having arisen, Mr. Wilson embraced unification and proclaimed it, nine months late.

If Mr. Wilson had been sitting every day with his administrator of food and with his administrator of fuel and with his administrator of ships, questioning them on their success and learning whether or not food movements and fuel movements were competently reaching our seaboard and competently crossing our docks into the ships awaiting them, he would have known months ago that unification was instantly imperative.

Moreover, if Mr. Wilson were sitting with those men now, and with his Secretary of War, questioning them, diligently and properly questioning them, every morning, he would know that our present "coördination" between our movements of troop supplies and our movements of ships is so abominable that our small fleet available for transatlantic purposes is, in effect, in practice, at least fifty per cent smaller.

Mr. Wilson's method of administration, his laggard and secluded method, brings it about that he is not, administratively, really a President at all. He is—we say it with no intended offense to anybody—a sort of King. A King must do no wrong. In order to do no wrong, he must, in a constitutional monarchy, hereditary or elective, Italian or French, take no administrative responsibility of any immediate kind. His appointed subordinates, his ministers, must take all the responsibilities and make all the errors. He must remain aloof, errorless. And then, in Mr. Wilson's case, when errors have accumulated into chaos, when Goethals and Denman have necessarily failed to build ships and when Willard and Harrison have necessarily failed to conduct transportation "coördinately" and successfully, the King appears and picks up the pieces and re-arranges them and retires to his throne-room; and then the re-arrangement, in his absence, travels on to the next failure without imperiling his reputation or soiling his sanctity.

Again without any intention of offense, we say that this method is profoundly a safe one, personally. It passes the discredits of disasters to a series of subordinates. But it is not disastrous merely to those subordinates. It is disastrous to the United States and to the War. Mr. Wilson cannot continue to be a King. A country cannot be efficient, administratively, with a King unless it also has a Prime Minister, every day administering and "coördinating" all departments personally. The hereditary King of Italy has a Prime Minister. The elected King of France has a Prime Minister. Our House of Representatives cannot constitutionally appoint a Prime Minister for Mr. Wilson. Mr. Wilson cannot constitutionally appoint one for himself. He has to be his own Prime Minister. It is absurd to say that he has no time for it. A man must have time for the first thing, the biggest thing, in his day's work. The British empire is a more complicated thing than the United States. Mr. Lloyd George finds time to sit with the other members of his War Cabinet continuously. We once spent three fruitless journalistic hours waiting for a member of that Cabinet because Mr. Lloyd George had insisted not only on a morning session but on an afternoon session, too. And no country can get on with the war, administratively, except with a Prime Minister, a compelling "coördinator," a continuous administrative master, like that.

Mr. Wilson is in many respects greatly Mr. Lloyd George's superior. In particular he is his superior in the field of moral interpretation. He is his superior as a prophet. And we must have prophecy or we shall perish. For prophecy means, as Mr. Wilson has done it, that the thing which makes it worth while to win this war will itself

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win. For that we must give him not merely applause but reverence. Yet it is also true that we shall come within the chance of perishing unless we get Administration.

We must get Administration not by interpretation after the event but by action running forward to meet the event. We must get Administration not by belated monarchical intervention but by continuous ministerial conference and decision, headed daily by the decisive minister-in-chief. We must get instant and genuinely " coördinated " Administration, " coördinated " not from the bottom feebly up but from the top strongly down. We must get it. We are not getting it now. The keystone of it is wanting. We talk about General Sharpe. We talk about Mr. Baker. There is just one man to talk about, in the end. We have to talk about Mr. Wilson. We have to talk about Mr. Wilson plainly. He is the only man who can be the keystone. He is not the keystone. He is not there.

Till he gets there, we may do a million little things admirably, but never the big things. Till he gets there, our " coördination " will be a popcorn " coördination."

WILLIAM HARD.

The Political Situation in Canada

CANADA lives in troublous times and her fabric of government like that of all other belligerent countries is undergoing great alterations. Until three months or so ago surprisingly few changes were evident; a striking contrast to the governmental system of Great Britain after which of course that of Canada is modeled. The strain naturally came much harder on the Mother Country, and until recently the only evidence of it in Canada was the extension of the life of Parliament. This life, limited by the British North America act to five years, was deemed insufficient in the midst of war by both political parties and the constitution was amended to allow a six year term.

But matters were precipitated by the introduction of the Conscription bill, which was passed by the Conservative majority in the House with the help of a few of the Liberals. The larger proportion of the latter opposed the bill on the grounds that a " moribund Parliament " had no right to legislate on so vital a matter without either an election or a referendum on the issue. In addition to this, the criticism from the opposition benches had in the last session abandoned its position of virtual acquiescence which it had held since August, 1914, and had become openly aggressive. Further extension of the parliamentary life would have resulted in disaster, an election was imperative, and conscription supplied the issue.

The Premier, Sir Robert Borden, not wishing to make conscription a party question and possibly fearing defeat for his party if he entered the fight unaided, endeavored to form a Union government, the successful culmination of which effort was seen about two months ago, when the " Win the War " Cabinet was sworn into office. This Cabinet is composed of both Liberal and Conservative conscriptionists, the Liberals being in a slight minority.

A new departure announced at the same time as the formation of the Union government is that there shall be a War Cabinet and also a Reconstruction and Development Committee, these two Committees being composed of ten members each, and including between them all members of the government. The Prime Minister is Chairman of both Committees. The aim seems to be the same as that in England, viz., to surmount the difficulty, as Lloyd George phrased it, of " running a war with a Sanhedrin," but it is difficult to see that the results will bear out the aim. The British have the small War Cabinet of five which is omnipotent, and the large and unwieldy Ministry which is a subordinate body. Canada has endeavored to split her executive into two divisions each of equal power and prestige, which are only separated by the flexible wall of function. The Prime Minister alone is a member of both Committees and his burden is already exceedingly heavy, without having the additional strain put upon him of being the only coördinating link between these two bodies. The British War Cabinet can at least get unity of effort and avoid a conflict of activity, but unless Canada creates additional machinery which will link the two Committees together, it looks as though the Cabinet will soon find itself in grave difficulties. The principle of joint responsibility also is in grave danger, yet this was regarded by Bagehot as the fundamental axiom of cabinet government.

A third novelty was the accession to the Cabinet of a large number of men who had at the time no seat in the Dominion House. They held provincial seats and had taken a prominent part in provincial politics, but their first introduction to the federal government took place when they were presented with a Dominion portfolio.

The general election of December 17th resulted in a victory of the Unionists over the old Liberal party by some fifty majority, with the soldier vote as yet uncounted. But while the Unionists under Sir Robert Borden have a substantial majority, it must be borne in mind that, counting the Laurier

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Liberals and the Liberal Unionists, the Liberals have 133 members in a house of 235. Thus the Liberal Unionists hold the balance of power, and on their action depends the fate of the government. That they will support the Military Service act is indubitable, but unless the Conservatives fulfil their pledges, made at the formation of the Union government, these Liberals are apt to cut loose from the alliance and rejoin the old Liberal party under Sir Wilfred Laurier, thus bringing a pure Liberal government into power. This fact, coupled with the presence of a strong opposition, should give Canada one of the best administrations in her history.

It is imperative that the government should act with unusual circumspection and wisdom. For it would not be difficult to find a more popular piece of legislation than the Military Service act; and the partizan War Times Elections act, under which the recent election was held, did not help matters. It must be remembered, however, that Canada has raised under voluntary enlistment more than 400,000 men, and that the United States to equal that in proportion would have to raise something like 5,000,000 men under the same system. The Nationalist sentiment in Quebec is violently against participation in the war, and the Liberals in the same province are equally strong against conscription, as shown by the recent election when they won sixty-two out of sixty-five seats. Over the whole of Canada, too, barely one-half of those required to register under the Military Service act did so, and of these about ninety per cent applied for exemption.

Looking at the entire situation as impartially as one can, the one conclusion that is driven remorselessly home is that Canada is on the horns of a dilemma. The voluntary system was dying, and breathed its last on the passage of the Conscription act without a referendum. The other alternative—the selective draft or conscription—has but a qualified support and is opposed by a solid Quebec, which composes over one-quarter of the total population of the Dominion. Over 1,600,000 of these 2,000,000 people are French, already possessing tendencies toward nationalism and anti-British feeling, which can be readily fanned into a violent opposition if they do not receive the most careful treatment. If the Union government enforces the terms of the Military Service act it incurs the risk of a serious rebellion; if it neglects to enforce the act, it violates both the spirit and the intent of the act, for its very raison d'être was Quebec.

R. MacG. Dawson.

International Trade Revolution

II. Unified Purchase

EVEN apart from the exigencies of the world shortage that will follow this war, the organization and the course of international trade is plainly destined to great changes. The war has made manifest, to a great and growing extent, the supersession of the business of the exporter. The export trade of the world has been very largely converted into an import trade. Instead of each country relying on an adequate supply of all sorts of commodities being automatically directed to its shores, by the enterprise and the desire for profit of the producers, the export merchants and the speculative traders in other lands, each country has increasingly—to put it simply—made its own purchases in, and fetched its own purchases home from the countries of production.

This supersession of the speculative export business by that of deliberately concerted imports has been going on quietly for more than half a century. The argosies that the eighteenth century merchants sent for sale in other lands were gradually replaced in nineteenth century business by the "order system," under which each producing country supplied principally what had already been definitely ordered on behalf of the consumers elsewhere. The decision and the control of the business was steadily more and more transferred from the country of production to the country of consumption. Even the import merchant began to be eliminated. The Coöperative Wholesale Society of Great Britain, now acting on behalf of three and one-half millions of families, has long bought—to name only a few of its two hundred and fifty million dollars' worth of purchases annually—its own currants in Greece, its own butter in Denmark, its own wheat in Chicago; and has brought its acquisitions home to its own mills and distributive stores. The corresponding Coöperative Wholesale Societies of other European countries, now representing nearly thirty millions of families (a quarter of the whole population of Europe) had, before the war, already started on a similar course.

The growing state and municipal enterprise of nearly all the European countries, and of the British Dominions, had likewise been leading to a continuous increase of purchases made in the countries of production directly for the consumers or users. The governments of India and of the

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British colonies buy their vast supplies direct from the manufacturing producers, in the country of production, and "do their own importing." During the war all the belligerent governments having access to other countries have gone straight to the producers there, made their colossal purchases there for the public account, and then and there shipped home the commodities they required. This has not been confined to munitions of war. The British government has undertaken the responsibility of providing the British Isles with imported food; and has actually made itself the sole importer of wheat, sugar, tea and, practically, of refrigerated meat, as well as of wool and various metals such as spelter and lead. The French and Italian governments have, in their own ways, followed suit. Such neutral states as Switzerland and the Scandinavian kingdoms have had to do the same.

This supersession, first of the exporting merchant by the importer, and then of the individual importer by collective organization, whether of a coöperative, a municipal or a governmental character, will evidently not cease with the war. The perils of starvation will compel every European government, immediately peace is declared, to continue and even to extend its purchasing in other lands. The capitalists themselves are adopting a similar course. It has already been definitely settled as a principle of commercial policy in Germany, Switzerland, France and the United Kingdom, that the buying of the chief raw materials required in the nation's various manufacturing industries, will, in future, have to be unified and centralized. The extravagance involved in the competition of purchasers for the overseas products can no longer be tolerated. The manufacturers will buy as a whole in the country of production, taking in one lot as much of the output as they think fit; and the wool, copper, hides, cotton, or what not will be brought home on joint account; "rationed" among the several establishments by an officially authorized committee, in which (in Great Britain at any rate) not only the employers but also the trade unions and the government will be represented; and manufactured under elaborate arrangements for "costing" and common audit of the factory accounts, for sale at standardized wholesale and retail prices.

How far each Trust will be autonomous, and free to plunder the helpless consumers;—to what extent it will be limited by fixed prices, publication of the audited accounts and statutory limits to the permissible dividends—and in what trades it will be superseded by that state or municipal enterprise to which the war is giving so tremendous an impetus, will depend on the reality of each country's democracy, and on the capacity and honesty of its governing class. Either way, the system of unified and centralized purchase in the countries of production, in gigantic lots sufficing for a whole nation's requirements, and the fetching home of these supplies by the agents of the buyers themselves—this is evidently going to be the future of the greater part of international trade between the advanced industrial communities—this system differs entirely from the business heretofore conducted by the jostling crowd of exporting and importing merchants and the various kinds of brokers and other auxiliaries who gathered round them.

The foreign exchanges will thereby be at any rate outwardly transformed. Instead of imports being paid for by exports, the debit and credit balances of the various countries of the world will arise from, and will be adjusted by, a continuous series of reciprocal imports. We may speculate on the whole remittance business of the world, which is but the provision for remitters of a convenient international currency, being undertaken by the one hundred and three separate postal administrations of the International Postal Union, as a development of their existing petty money order business.

The giving of credit by the discounting of bills of exchange will doubtless be left to the financiers. But there seems no reason why government guaranteed drafts (whether postal, cable or wireless) should not be sold over the counter for cash at any of the three hundred thousand post offices of the world, at an infinitesimal commission, up to any amount desired; made payable, under reasonable conditions of notice, in local legal tender at any other designated post office in the world. The debit or credit balances of each state post office could be telegraphically adjusted, monthly, weekly or even daily, at the head office of the International Postal Union by transfers in the official current accounts, secured by adequate deposits, that all the governments would keep at London, New York, Paris and Berlin. Fluctuations in the rates of exchange, and periodical gold shipments, might not at first be entirely eliminated, but they would at any rate be enormously reduced.* It is possible that the extensive *arbitrage* business in remittances (apart from international dealings in securities), which we have managed to do without for over three years, may never be resumed in the old speculative freedom.

How does this forecast of the future organization and procedure of at any rate a large growing part of international trade bear on the tariff controversy? It will be noticed that the supersession of the speculative export trade by deliberately concerted buying in the country of production and

* See the scheme worked out in detail in the Fabian Research Department's How to Pay for the War (London: George Allen and Unwin: 6/—net).

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by collective importing, brings the business more directly under the control of the consumers. Through the coöperative society, the municipality and the state (which are all organizations of consumers for the direct satisfaction of their own needs) the consumers are more and more taking over the business of the world—a tendency less obvious as yet to a citizen of the United States or the Canadian Dominion than it is to a citizen of Europe, Australia or New Zealand. Certain portions of international trade seem, at present, immune from this tendency; and will long remain within the domain of the capitalist exporter. These are (a) the supply of the demands of the non-adult races, and indeed of the less industrially advanced communities generally; (b) the trade involved in the "peaceful penetration" of these communities by capitalist enterprises and loans from the richer nations, and (c) even in these richer nations, so long as they remain under private property ownership, the provision of exotic luxuries, which neither the government, the municipality nor the coöperative society is likely to undertake.

Of more immediate interest is perhaps the bearing of what is happening on tariff policy. The war has, so far, in Europe generally, thrown the customs tariffs flat. On the other hand, it has stirred up nationalist feelings to such an extent as to inspire the Protectionists in all countries with the rosiest dreams of triumph. But the prospect of a general world shortage, and of the need for international regulation, has already dissipated these dreams. The growing strength of the Labor and Socialist parties in all European countries is being thrown emphatically against fiscal protection.

In August last, the great conference of the British labor party, in conformity with a similar policy determined on by the British Trades Union Congress and against the opposition of only a tiny minority, adopted the following emphatic declaration of economic policy. It is not sufficiently realized how definitely the British wage-earning class has decided against any "economic war after the war"; against any discrimination against foreign countries; against any departure from the "Policy of the Open Door," and against any other fiscal protection:

> The Conference declares against all the projects now being prepared by imperialists and capitalists, not in any one country only, but in practically all countries, for an Economic War after Peace has been secured, either against one or other foreign nation or against all foreign nations. Such an Economic War, if begun by any country, would inevitably lead to reprisals, to which each nation in turn might in self-defense be driven. The Conference realizes that all such attempts at economic aggression, whether by Protective Tariffs or capitalist trusts or monopolies, inevitably results in the spoliation of the working classes of the several countries for the profit of the capitalists; and the Conference sees in the alliance between the Military Imperialists and the Fiscal Protectionists in any country whatsoever not only a serious danger to the prosperity of the masses of the people, but also a grave menace to Peace. On the other hand, the right of each nation to the defense of its own economic interests cannot be denied. The Conference accordingly urges upon the Socialist and Labor parties of all countries the importance of insisting, in the attitude of the government towards commercial enterprise, on the principle of the open door; on Customs Duties being limited strictly to revenue purposes, and on there being no hostile discrimination against foreign countries. But the Conference urges equally the importance of the utmost possible development by appropriate government action of the resources of every country for the benefit not only of its own people but also of the world; and the need for an international agreement for the enforcement in all countries of the legislation on factory conditions, hours of labor and the prevention of "sweating" and unhealthy trades necessary to protect the workers against exploitation and oppression.

It is the opinion of the present writer that this intensity of conviction of the organized European town proletariat, together with that of the European coöperators, now counting an actual membership of some thirty million families, will probably prevent, after the war, any increase, or even any prolonged continuance, of at least the more blatant forms of fiscal protection. The world shortage will, for years to come, make import duties look both oppressive and ridiculous; and the need for international control of supplies will make for their suspension. In the relations of the advanced communities with each other, the steady conversion of the bulk of the export trade into an import trade, and the adoption of the principle of unified purchasing in the country of production, with importation on collective account, will compel us all to realize that import duties are inept.

How far this collective importing will be left in the hands of the organized capitalist manufacturers and wholesalers, organized in trusts, and subjected to more or less effective control by the government in the interests of the consumers, will depend on the balance of political forces in each country. What it looks like in the England of the moment, is that more and more the purchases in other countries will be made by the agents of the organized consumers, who will choose, for themselves, in co-operative society, municipality or state department, exactly what they will buy from producers abroad; what they will grow in their own plantations overseas, and what they will make in their own factories at home. This, in fact, happens to be the answer to the supposed insoluble conundrum of "How, under Socialism, could Foreign Trade be carried on?"

SIDNEY WEBB.

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In France

THIS morning near the front in northern France I met an American woman. It was in a narrow cobbled street lined with tumbled ruins and the charred skeletons of homes. In the midst of these grim surroundings the sight of her Yankee face, the first I'd seen in six months, was most welcome. She was engaged in some sort of relief work. What did she think of it all, I was anxious to know.

" Oh," she exclaimed, her eyes bright with excitement, " I'm having the time of my life! "

. . . . .

Around the corner there trudges a detachment of poilus, just from the trenches. Men of middle age; some with their straggling mustaches tinged with gray; backs bent under the heavy loads of packs, *musettes, bidons,* rifles; horizon-blue *casques* and coats splotched with mud. After their long watch and six kilos this morning, their drawn gray faces and tired expressionless eyes show no interest in the two Americans.

" Oh," says the American Relief Worker, " isn't it thrilling! "

. . . . .

Tonight with my poilu companions at our *popote,* I know how far from my own country I have come. C. LEROY BALDRIDGE.

A Program of War Housing

IN articles published in earlier issues of The New Republic it has been pointed out that the need of provision for the housing of workers employed in munitions and shipbuilding undertakings is now extremely urgent, and that there is no satisfactory solution of the problem which does not involve governmental aid. Private enterprise cannot be expected to plunge into the erection of dwellings for workingmen who may have to be dispersed when the war is over, no matter how indispensable the supply of such dwellings may be to national efficiency in war. The creation of workingmen's dwellings at the points where labor is now most needed may or may not entail loss of capital in the end. The risk, all will agree, is present, and private enterprise ought not to be called upon to assume it. Whatever loss may be involved in housing the workers who alone can make effective the resources with which we are carrying on war is as properly a war cost as the expenditures for shells and explosives. Such loss should clearly be borne by the nation as a whole.

The government is at work upon the housing problem, but it will work most fruitfully if the field is prepared by a public opinion alive to the issues at stake. With this end in view the following tentative program is offered, as one that is capable of practically immediate application. It is based on the assumption that while the work of providing emergency housing is primarily of national interest, there are so many benefits to be derived from it by state and local governing bodies that coöperation and sharing of responsibilities are desirable.

Take, for example, the city of Newark, which will need between now and June 1, 1918, between 30,000 and 40,000 more houses. This city is certain to be a very large and permanent beneficiary of any policy which secures the building of these homes, since it is estimated that the pay-roll of its citizens would be increased by at least $75,000,000 per year. Of course, this involves a corresponding increase of receipts from taxation, and increased attractiveness to other industries. The state of New Jersey becomes also a beneficiary of any successful war-housing policy for its largest city, Newark, is virtually a state port and its growth and prosperity affect the growth and prosperity of the state as a whole.

It is impossible to determine precisely the proportions in which city and state would share the benefits of such a housing program as is now imperatively required, and accordingly it is impossible now to determine the extent in which state and city should share the financial responsibility. But equal sharing may be accepted at least tentatively as an equitable and feasible arrangement.

To this it may be objected that the states have not conceded to cities such rights and powers as would enable them to embark on this kind of enterprise, and furthermore, most cities have, as a rule, reached, or nearly reached, their legal limits of bonded indebtedness. Therefore, no additional funds, at least in any such amount as would be needed for war-housing, would be available.

As to the first objection, any state willing to cooperate in such an enterprise would concede to the cities whatever powers are necessary to enable them to do their part. And, as to the second objection, there are various ways of meeting the difficulty. In New York State, for instance, the necessary money can be obtained by certificates of indebtedness, instead of bonds, while, of course, any state may legalize a bond issue for this purpose. In some states there would be serious delay unless a special session of the legislature were called, but in New Jersey the legislature meets on January 8, 1918, thus making possible immediate legislation.

The difficulty involved in the exhaustion of the legal borrowing capacity on cities can be effectively dealt with by classifying the project of municipal housing with other income-producing municipal en-

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terprises, for municipal housing can, in fact, be made an income-producing enterprise. This is proved by the financial success of the numerous English experiments in municipal housing.

If then the city and the state will coöperate to make the assumption of this equal and joint obligation legally practicable, the national government will be justified in agreeing to underwrite their housing bonds against any loss that may properly be attributed to war causes. Such action would, in all probability, make it possible to secure the entire amount of money necessary at the same rate of interest that the government is now paying. The leading insurance companies could and would supply practically all the money needed. They could afford to do this at their lowest rates because the factor of risk would be entirely eliminated.

But is it not necessary for state and city to await action by the federal government before committing themselves to the financial responsibilities involved? Under this program the federal government would not be asked to assume the chief burden of expense, but only so much as is directly related to the war, the losses that may arise out of non-use when emergency production ceases, or out of the writing off of the excess costs of construction under war-time conditions. There is little fear on the part of private interests that the government will not reimburse them in the end for capital outlays made in the government interest and not recovered in profits before the peace. There should be still less reason for fearing that the federal government would not reimburse the states and the cities for any losses they might actually incur. Action by the federal authorities, though sure, is likely to be slow, and it would be a misfortune if the states and cities decided to wait upon it.

And, in this connection, let us bear in mind that the risk of loss to state and city should not be placed at an exaggerated figure. Delay in providing adequate housing means a heavy loss in the pay-rolls of city and state. It means more than this, in unemployment, disease and disorder. Such indirect losses ought surely to outweigh the risk that the federal government will repudiate its valid and obvious obligations.

Financial responsibility, as we have indicated, should properly be divided between the federal, state and local governments. But the requirements to be supplied are national, and the need for a suitable national body of administration and control is urgent. On this point we could hardly do better than to adopt the recommendations of the well-known New York architect, Mr. Frederick W. Ackerman, published in the January number of the Journal of the American Institute of Architects. These recommendations are based upon a recent firsthand study of the results of British war-housing methods. They indicate a national program, but they might well be adopted by the state governments, pending federal action. Mr. Ackerman asks "how shall we organize this phase of war?" and answers it by the following recommendations:

> First: Create a central body with
>
> a. Powers to acquire land with authority equal to that created by the British Defense of the Realm Act. (The final disposition of property need not now be treated.)
>
> b. Powers to survey needs for housing facilities and to determine, in coöperation with a central priority board, the relative importance of industrial operations.
>
> c. Powers to design and construct communities where the needs of such have been made evident by the survey.
>
> d. Powers to operate and manage these communities during the war and for a few years thereafter, along lines of policy similar to that expressed by what is known as the Copartnership Tenants of Public Utility Societies in England.
>
> e. Powers to maintain a high standard of physical wellbeing in munition plants (adopting the standards set by our most progressive industrial corporation) and to organize community activities within the communities thus created.
>
> Second: Create a commission to study the final disposition of these properties. Such a commission should consider such questions as:
>
> a. The organization of local non-profit corporations to manage and develop the communities created during the war.
>
> b. The saving of the appreciation of land values for the benefit of the community as a whole.
>
> c. The establishment of that part of the costs which should be written off as belonging to the cost of war.
>
> d. The basis upon which such communities would be transferred to municipalities or to non-profit corporations.
>
> By such a method it would be possible to advance immediately upon new schemes, and in the event of lack of progress upon schemes now under way, such schemes could be taken over by the government and handled through the central body."

This program of financing and organization would, if now adopted, meet the emergency of this housing crisis. It now remains to propose a constructive program of administration to supplement these foregoing financial and organization recommendations. The success of our war-housing administration is now being threatened by various professional interests, especially those of the architects and the town planners. Many of these gentlemen are convinced of the government's need of their services and each believes that the priority of his profession should be recognized. Relief from the evident menace of such a situation can be definitely assured only by choosing an executive who shall be without professional interests or affiliations of any kind whatever and upon whom shall be placed the entire responsibility for provid-

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ing all necessary war-housing. He should be possessed of the greatest experience in finance and large enterprise and be at the same time determined to produce the highest possible social welfare. Make him responsible to the Cabinet and the President. Give him authority to assign the various fields to be surveyed to sociologists, town planners, architects, engineers and financial directors of his choosing. Before long he will be able to choose the members of his housing cabinet, and upon them he will rely for advice. Meetings of such a housing cabinet would be frequently held to secure the most effective correlation, but the executive should alone make and assume the responsibility for all decisions. For such additional powers and such further financial support as he needed to consummate this work he must look to the President and his Cabinet.

ROBERT ANDERSON POPE.

The Poet of Armageddon: John Davidson

JOHN DAVIDSON was the only recent poet writing in English who was distinctly modern in his thought—the only poet in whom Nietzsche and Nietzsche's forebears, Darwin and Schopenhauer, had become part of a fierce being. One is tempted to speak of him as topical when one reads his last tragedy, Mammon and His Message. The great cathedral is crumbling under the fire of the guns that the ruler of Thule has turned upon it; the propagandists meet to launch their idea:

> That new racial myth which we incept,
> Uncatholic and Teutonic.

the revolutionaries debate their idealisms; the War-Lord announces his gospel:

> Only by fire and slaughter can the earth
> Be purged of Christiandom! By words, by talk,
> By argument, apparent things are done,
> But actual change by war alone arrives.

Mammon and His Message, published ten years ago, carries more sense of ruin and combustion and the conflict of ideas than any report which has come to us out of Armageddon or its environs.

John Davidson was a Scotchman, and, as Mr. J. B. Yeats has remarked somewhere, there is in the Scotch mind a quality that comes from the gregariousness of the people. In Scotch writing and in Scotch painting there is always a sense of the reader, of the spectator. "Man, what do you think of that?" a presence beyond the picture or the book enquires. That sense is in the writing of Stevenson and of Barrie and even of Burns. And in the same way Davidson's thought—even his most daring and startling thought—has to be shared; it has to be expounded or wrangled over, rather than divined. It has never the quality that is, for instance, in Kipling's:

> I see the sergeants pitchin' quoits,
> I 'ear the women laugh and talk,
> I spy upon the quarter-deck
> The orficers and ladies walk;
> I think upon the things that was,
> And leans and looks acrost the sea,
> Till spite of all the crowded ship,
> There's no one left alive but me.

Davidson's utterance is always by way of a statement that you must assent to or dissent from. It is such as is in this passage from The Vengeance of the Duchess:

> The lowest struggling motion and the fiercest blood on fire,
> The tree, the flower, are pressing outwards to a future ever higher,
> To reach the mood august wherein we know we suffer pain.

He wrote distinctive poetry in many forms—the ballad, the eclogue, the verse-tragedy and the blank verse monologue to which he gave the name of Testament. His ballads were greatly praised and there are powerful passages in them, but we read them with a sense of strain, for the poet seems to be using a form meant for the narration of an external action for the purpose of dramatic analysis. His best ballad is not The Ballad of a Nun; is not The Vengeance of the Duchess; it is the free and fantastic Ballad of a Runnable Stag. His eclogues in which groups of people are set discussing a theme are good in their blank verse passages and rather artificial in their rhymed verse episodes. Davidson's most distinctive work is his Testaments and the tragedy already spoken of, Mammon and His Message.

These are his exhibits of the modern spirit. When he came to write them he looked upon himself as nothing less than a prophet. "I devour, digest and assimilate the Universe," he wrote, "make for myself in my Testaments and Tragedies a new form and substance of Imagination; and by poetic power certify the semi-certitudes of science." In the epilogue in which he makes this statement he rails at the title of a book, The Rise of Rationalism in Europe. "There was never a rise of Rationalism," he says justly, "there was only a decay of Imagination." The decay he purposed to arrest by making a new form and substance of imagination.

The medium to be used was blank verse. He had always been able to make blank verse potent. Now he began to speak of it as the only form in

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which a poet could make a great statement. He became dithyrambic in praise of it. English blank verse, he declared, had come into being when a new mode of expression was needed—"by design of Providence, the theologian would say; in metaphysics as the inevitable outcome of the conditions; or as I can feel, see and grasp it best, English blank verse came into being like folk, or flowers, or light, as a material emanation of the concrete mystery, matter." . . . "I leap to this conclusion," he said, in what was for him a moderate statement on the subject, "that matter nowhere in the Universe has evolved anything transcending mundane man, or a nobler utterance than this very blank verse."

Is there in his Testaments and his Tragedy anything of that which would justify his assumption of authority and the claim which he makes for the medium of his utterance? I, for one, think there is. If you are not repelled by a philosophy which has Zarathustra's destructiveness without Zarathustra's austerity you will find in his four Testaments and in Mammon and his Message astonishing eloquence, with imaginative fantasy and frequent passages of startling beauty.

We can best understand his thought if we begin by recognizing it as "theocentric." Like Francis Thompson, John Davidson is compelled to see everything as centering round God. With Thompson this makes for humility while with Davidson it makes for more and more violent self-assertion. John Davidson was a Calvinist through and through. Now you cannot take God from a man who is a Calvinist. Prove that the universality of matter leaves no place for God in the universe and you plant God in his own bosom. So it was with Davidson. He declares himself a materialist, but he is constantly asserting something about God. Finally, as matter in its highest self-consciousness, he himself is the end of all things, he himself is God. Then the world process is seen as a Calvinistic syllogism: there is still the elect and the reprobate, but the elect is now the beautiful, the strong, the assertive; while the reprobate is the ill-formed, the weak, the resigned.

Into his four Testaments and into his Mammon and his Message he has poured the full strength of a remarkable poetic power. Comparisons are a feeble help to judgment in such things, but one could compare Davidson's blank verse with Tennyson's or Browning's or Shelley's and say that it is as potent as theirs. One's response is the best test of poetry, and in a passage like this where Davidson's delight in vibrant life has full sweep, response becomes an ungrudging acknowledgment of the poet's power. The man in The Testament of an Empire-Builder hears in a dream the beasts speak, and listens to the nag exult in its ancestry:

> Those valiant hearts
> Triumphant in the combat for the mares
> When the great miracle of grass begins,
> And simple emerald blades elaborate
> The soul of earth, the virtue of the sun,
> Replenishing the sexes—how might they,
> Those hearts of stallions eager for a heaven
> Of fragrant manes, wild glances, quivering flanks,
> Wherein to root their admirable race—
> How might they lose their courage, how admit
> The treacherous fear that undermines the will?

The poetry of the Testaments is constantly rising into such passages.

His four Testaments are the Evangels of Materialism. In the Testament of a Vivisector, we have the defense of a man who seeks through torture for pure knowledge—who in the end tortures for the sake of torturing. In The Testament of a Man Forbid we have the confession of one who cried to humanity to cast away their three thousand years of culture and to cease to balance libraries on their polls. In The Testament of a Prime Minister we have the statement of a politician who is led to renounce his career, because he has seen how crime and misery can make a man great by putting him beyond good and evil. In The Testament of an Empire-Builder—he might be Clive or he might be Cecil Rhodes—we have the gospel of exploitation and the announcement that the strong shall not only inherit the earth, but they shall have the heavens also, and that the weak shall not only be condemned in this life, but they shall be damned for all eternity.

The thesis that runs all through Davidson's poetry is that the soul is matter become self-conscious and that matter becomes more and more self-conscious through pain. The whole world process is towards the experience of more and more intensity of pain. This idea, fiercely expressed in his last, is present in his first poems:

> To reach the mood august in which we know we suffer pain—
> Napoleon! I am greater by this woe and by this chain.

The logical consequence of his idea is present in his last work. If there is nothing beyond the self-consciousness that matter attains to in us, why should we not experience at once all the pain and all the rapture there is in life? Why should we not live it all now? Davidson's characters attempt to make such a realization.—

> *We* have come after! *We* are posterity,
> And time it is we had another world
> Than this in which mankind excreted soul,
> Sexless and used and immaterial.

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Clear a space profane, that men at last
May be themselves, the conscious universe!
Who asks a higher task, a nobler game,
A more heroic agony?

So speaks the King of Thule who has taken to himself the name of Mammon and who has begun a crusade against Christianity.

If we are repelled by the Testaments because of their alien and threatening psychology and their resolute attempt to transcend good and evil, what are we to say of the play that has for its hero one who is a parricide and a fratricide, a ravisher and a torturer, and the declared foe of the Christian idea? No point is made by saying that "Mammon and His Message" is immoral—it is intended to be immoral. We must read it as we read Marlowe's mad play. And it justifies itself by lifting the imagination by fervent rhetoric and by the spectacle it gives of unbridled power. It is the modern version of Tambourlaine.

John Davidson died by his own act in 1906. The talk about his poverty, the controversy that grew up as to the state's duty in providing for its literary men, the assumption voiced by even such a friend of Davidson's as William Watson that the poet's best period had long been passed, distracted from the discovery that the Testaments and Mammon and his Message made a body of remarkable poetry which expressed in English the urge that was in the mind of Protestant Europe. The threat of cancer, the narrowness of his means were not, I think, the really determining motives for his suicide. Davidson would have gone on living had he been given any of that recognition which he thought was due to him as a poet-prophet.

Fame is worth the cost
Blood-sweats and tears and haggard homeless lives.
How dare a man appealing to the world
Content himself with ten! How dare a man
Appeal to ten when all the world should hear?

The world would not heed him, and the fact that he earned little money and had only a small state-pension was a sympton of its heedlessness, and it was that heedlessness that goaded him into making an end. "My message is a deed, always a deed," King Mammon cried, and John Davidson would not do less than make his passing a deed. The idea of suicide had always been present in his writing. In Smith, his early tragedy, the hero and the poet who is the hero's friend, commit suicide merely, it would seem, for the experience of the thing. "My source of strength," he wrote in an early poem, "had been the lurking thought,

That poison or the bullet or the wave
Could stop the unendurable ecstasy
Of pain or pleasure, at whatever pole
Of passion I determined to forsake
The orb of life on my acceptance thrust
In ignorance and disregard of me.

The suicide in Romeo and Juliet had appealed to him as the final triumph of the will to live "which every sane suicide must be; despair—really the highest power and sublimation of hope—choosing death rather than resignation; the will to live, the pride of life that cannot renounce, the beautiful, the transcendent passion, whereby the world survives, destroying itself rather than want its will." He fought the battle for Imagination under a flag the color of which soon becomes too downright for the Imagination—the red flag. Under it, however, he won considerable victories.

PADRAIC COLUM.

CORRESPONDENCE

A Bureau of School Feeding

SIR: At the present moment in New York City there are between one and two thousand children suffering from underfeeding. The condition is not new, but it is far worse than it has ever been before. Besides those suffering constantly from underfeeding there are large numbers of periodically mal-nourished children. The one immediate and practical way of bettering this condition is to extend the scope of school feeding and to bring it directly under the control of the Board of Education. The aim should be to provide all children with one palatable nutritious meal a day.

The opponents to this plan claim that it is not the function of educational authorities to provide food for the pupils, and that it will pauperize the children. They are answered by the fact that education is wasted on children who are not in a condition to receive it. The state has no right to require underfed children to go to school. And the cost of providing for social misfits is greater than the cost of such preventive measures as providing school lunches. As for the question of pauperization, there is no such question under the American system of school feeding. The food is sold at cost to all children who desire it, not alone the needy; in this way making the system entirely a business enterprise. The system is constructive in that it reaches the children before they become subjects for relief, and it is democratic because it makes the lunch available to all children without distinction of class.

The school lunch work in New York City is carried on by two voluntary committees. They have assumed financial responsibility for providing food and labor and for any deficit in any individual school. The Department of Education has, however, appropriated money for equipment, and it has furnished free space. It has never appropriated money for food and labor. The aim has always been to make the income received from the children cover the cost of food and its preparation. But owing to the rise in costs there is likely to be a slight deficit while the unfavorable conditions last.

Of the 504 elementary schools in the five boroughs of New York, 53 are receiving school lunch service. Lunches are also served in some of the high schools. After a thorough study the New York School Lunch Committee

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has decided that, both in the interests of economy and of a scientific and adequate system of school feeding, the elementary and high school lunch systems ought to be combined in a Bureau of School Feeding. The Committee suggests that at the head of this Bureau should be a director, responsible to the Board of Education, and provided with the necessary deputies and assistants. Great economies could be made by applying the central kitchen plan to both elementary and high schools. For a thorough system of school lunches one more central kitchen is needed in upper Manhattan, one is needed in the Bronx and two in Brooklyn.

It is difficult to estimate in advance the cost to the city of assuming entirely the work of feeding school children, for this would depend on the number of schools served and the policy adopted by the Department of Education. But the Committee can tell what it costs to serve lunches in the thirty-four schools operated by it last year. The cost in any case will be far from prohibitive, considering the value of this service to the community. In an anæmic class after lunches were served there was an average gain per child of 3-12 pounds in ten weeks, and the number of absences was reduced from 583 to 39. In the face of such evidence objections have small validity.

S. T. TYLER.

Judge Daingerfield on Judges

SIR: In your article on Breaking the Labor Truce, published in your issue of December 22, 1917, you make a mistake common to most editors and almost universal except among judges and lawyers. Your mistake is in supposing that the duties of a judge are elastic along lines whereon elasticity is forbidden. There are, it is true, many situations that arise in the administration of justice where a kind of elasticity called "judicial discretion" is not only allowed but required, and where "grave abuse" of discretion is the degree of abuse necessary before an appellate court may properly disturb the action of a lower court, even if to the upper court it seems that what was done by the lower court might have been done better otherwise.

But elasticity is wholly forbidden in the matter of deciding what the law *is*. What, in the opinion of the judges, the law *ought* to be is immaterial for judicial purposes.

A judge is like a bookkeeper, who must faithfully state what his employer's trial-balance sheet shows; or he is like a thermometer, which must, without favor, show the temperature; or he is like a steam-governor or a timepiece balance-wheel. In the matters incidental to the conduct of a case he has, within well defined limits, the judicial discretion of which I speak, but he has no discretion to declare the law to be what he believes it not to be, or to declare as a fact in the case what he believes to be false.

It results that courts cannot "legislate" except within narrow limits, which do not concern the purposes of this letter. It also results that a court cannot "deliver an attack . . . *designed* to undermine" a litigant before it, and that no person has a right to lower the respect due to public officers by any such insinuation, without other evidence than the decision and the judicial record of the case. These are in fact not evidence at all of what the judges think the law ought to be. Judges are human and fallible, but they need as much protection as any other officers do, from criticism founded on what appears to me to be a widespread misapprehension of the nature of their functions and of the methods by which they study out what the law is.

When you call the decision you criticise, one likely to "confirm the popular feeling already strengthened by recent constitutional decisions, that a majority of the Supreme Court are endeavoring to enforce their own reactionary views of public policy in direct opposition to the more enlightened views prevailing in legislatures and among the public," and then, with your very next breath, say "for there was no statute, and no binding precedent, to justify the decision," you seem to suffer from confusion of thought. Surely if there are no statutes or precedents in a matter the court must decide the law as the law was some time previously, and that kind of law you term "reactionary." Legislatures, Congress, Boards of Supervisors and the like make new laws when they think best, and courts immediately decide the rights of litigants in accordance with the new laws, whenever the new laws are applicable. If it becomes necessary to amend a constitution or a city charter to remove some prohibition against an unconstitutional or otherwise void law, that can be done if the "enlightened views" of the public at the ballot-box so direct.

Furthermore I am puzzled at your saying that there were no binding precedents in this matter after you had just said that there had been recently decided cases on constitutional points that in your, or at least in the public's opinion, were germane to this case. I do not state your words, but that is what I gather from them. I suppose that by "popular feeling" you mean public opinion.

There are other objectionable statements in your article, implying motive or intent on the part of our Supreme Court judges, but what I have said covers them all. It is necessary that precedents should be strongly advisory on all courts, otherwise no lawyer could advise a client that what seemed to be the latter's rights and duties today would remain unchanged until the proper non-judicial body or officer should change the law of the client's case hereafter.

WILLIAM R. DAINGERFIELD.

Berkeley, California.

"Women in War Industries"

SIR: I regret that my article on Women in War Industries should be criticised on the ground of misstatement, and, though you may not consider it well to continue the controversy in print, I should like to make the following reply to Miss Goldmark's objections:

1. At the time the article was written, the Department of Labor had recommended that government contracts should be refused to home workers, but this recommendation had not yet been put into effect by the Departments issuing contracts, and Mrs. Kelly had not finished her preliminary work in the War Department. The approved labor standards of the Quartermaster General were not announced until several weeks later just before the publication of the article.

2. Miss Goldmark evidently misunderstands the statement that the advisory committee could not "openly denounce night work for women." The point was that since the committee was advisory to the government it could make recommendations to the government and did so, as both Miss Goldmark and the article state; but it obviously was not in a position to exert pressure on the government by a campaign of publicity for the measures it recommended.

3. My observation that "orthodox trade unionists wish

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action to come chiefly from the organized workers" was founded on the statements of prominent women at the American Federation of Labor headquarters, at the Department of Labor and at the Women's Committee of the Council of National Defense, who complained that protective action was delayed because trade unionists regarded government paternalism with suspicion. I was asked to make no direct quotations on the matter.

4. The bulletin urging women collectively to refuse to work on night shifts was shown to me by a member of Mrs. Harriman's committee.

5. Miss Goldmark again misunderstands the statement that if the Advisory Committee would agree on the necessary steps, it would be a comparatively simple matter to put them into operation. The point was that no federal or state legislation is required to regulate conditions in government plants. All that is needed is an executive order from the Secretary of War. The subsidiary negotiations of adjustment committees are indeed difficult, but the statement did not refer to these negotiations, but to just such an order as has recently been issued by the Quartermaster General.

Miss Goldmark seems to imply that the article was intended to disparage the work of the women's committees. If this had been the intention, she would have been justified in resenting it, but it was not. The article was written in the belief, perhaps mistaken, that the work of the committees would be reinforced if publicity were given to the fact that, as Miss Goldmark admits at the outset, the government has been backward in the matter.

ESTHER NORTON.

New York City.

Is German Infectious?

SIR: Perhaps you will be interested in a few samples of the opinions recently collected by the Los Angeles Times in a careful canvass of public sentiment with regard to the teaching of German in the public schools during the war.

Frank R. Willis, Superior Court Judge: "We are opposed to Prussianism in this country; German literature is intended to uphold Prussianism. That is sufficient reason for us to exclude it from the schools."

Mayor F. T. Woodman: "I cannot see why any American-born girl or boy should care to study a language that in any wise gives comfort or encouragement to our enemies."

Paul J. McCormick, Superior Judge: "If the German language has any beneficial aspects it can be only in the higher institutions of learning, and then only in the study of philosophy. The study of German literature and history is likely to leave the wrong impression upon the mind of our students; for German literature sizzles with the theory that might makes right and advocates the subjugation of the weak by the strong."

Fred H. Taft, Superior Judge: "I am against everything German from A to Izzard."

Howard E. Hinshaw, justice of the peace: "The student cannot study German literature without being strongly impressed, and that impression would not likely augur well for American patriotism."

Dr. Lulu Peters, public health chairman of the District Federation of Women's Clubs: "If the teaching of German in our schools gives one-hundredth of one per cent comfort and satisfaction, we should eliminate it."

Postmaster Harrington Brown: "Germany has furnished us much in the way of high-class literature, art and music, but let us get along with the American product."

Mrs. Grace Mellus Thompson: "If we don't exclude everything German we never would win the war."

United States Marshal Walton: "The only good that can come from a study of the German language in the public schools will be to the German government itself and its people. I am therefore opposed to it in every shape and form."

J. W. Summerfield, justice of the peace: "As a nation, Germany teaches undemocratic principles, and our children of the impressionable age should not be compelled to study anything which might make them falter in deciding in their minds questions of a governmental nature."

Commissioner of Public Works P. P. O'Brien: "It may seem harsh to many who are studying German as a step toward higher education, but we want no German kultur in our country, so stamp it out before it reaches a dangerous stage."

Perhaps a fourth of the notables interviewed saw no particular danger in continuing the teaching of the German language.

CARL H. P. THURSTON.

Pasadena, California.

"Rearranging" Austro-Hungary

SIR: President Wilson's recent message to the Congress, requesting a declaration of war upon Austria-Hungary, contained the following sentence: "We owe it, however, to ourselves to say that we do not wish in any way to impair or to rearrange the Austro-Hungarian Empire." Taken alone and separate from its context, this sentence has given rise to a number of misleading interpretations, some of which are diametrically opposed to each other. It may not be therefore amiss to present these for the consideration of the public, through the medium of your publication.

It has long been a matter of public knowledge that ever since the famous note of the Allies, addressed to President Wilson in January, 1917, the Magyars (Hungarians), both those in Hungary and also their friends in the United States, have been extremely anxious to bring about a repudiation of the aims set forth in that. As is well known, the Allies at that time insisted on the liberation of the Czecho-Slovaks, the South Slavs, and other oppressed nationalities of Austria-Hungary. If this plan were to be carried out, the Austro-Hungarian empire would have to be not only rearranged, but completely dismembered. So the anxiety of the friends of the Hapsburg Monarchy for a guaranty of the "territorial integrity" of Hungary, with its consequent oppression of the non-Magyar nationalities of Austria-Hungary, is perfectly comprehensive.

By these people the above mentioned sentence is construed as a guaranty of such "territorial integrity" not only of Hungary, but of the whole Dual Monarchy. These people have not hesitated to seize hold of this sentence for the purpose of ridiculing the efforts of the Czecho-Slovaks, the South Slavs and others who have long ago taken a decided stand along the side of the Allies in the hope that when the future peace conference adjourns full justice shall have been done to their oppressed compatriots, to whose fate they are not indifferent. More than one of them has said in effect, "Go ahead: urge your men to go to France to fight and to bleed for the Allied cause," and then with a sneer, "but you must remember that the

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present boundaries of the Dual Monarchy are to remain intact."

Of course it is very easy to refute this interpretation and to point out the fallacy in such an argument. It must be remembered that we are at war with Austria-Hungary, and that war times are no time to guarantee the territorial integrity of our enemies. To guarantee the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary at the present time would be as foolish as to say, when two opponents meet in mortal combat, " I shall certainly overcome you, but I guarantee not to smash your nose during the struggle."

A second interpretation of that sentence, which also commands the support of The New Republic, is that the President meant to suggest that the dissatisfied nationalities of the Dual Monarchy, such as, for example, the Czecho-Slovaks, who, if their aspirations and longing for independence are not satisfied, will constitute a menace to the future peace of Europe, should content themselves with some extended form of autonomy, as, for example, the Hungarians, or, to speak with precision, the Magyars enjoy. (Not all Hungarians are autonomous, but only the Magyars. The Slovaks, the Rumanians, the Ruthenians and the South Slavs, who in the territorial sense may also be called Hungarians, are no more autonomous than the Bohemians.)

Such an interpretation may on the surface appear plausible, but it cannot be accepted unless we are prepared to hold the President guilty of inconsistency. It must be remembered that on January 22, 1917, President Wilson said " that every people should be left free to determine its own way of development unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful." On more than one occasion the President has expressed himself in favor of a full justice to the oppressed nationalities, and of permitting them to determine their own fate. More clearly than any other statesman of to-day he realizes that the world can never be at peace so long as " the will is in rebellion," and so long as " there is no tranquillity of spirit, of freedom and of right." There is not one reference in any of the President's speeches to a desire on the part of America to coerce any nation into the acceptance of some one or other form of government, or to force it to remain under the sovereignty of a dynasty which the people no longer desire to tolerate. To believe that the President meant to suggest that the Bohemians, for example, who as late as October 23rd openly proclaimed in the Austrian Reichsrath that " the Bohemian deputies have made a sincere declaration that they desire an independent state, a free nation. . . . The Czecho-Slovak nation has no confidence in a form of state in which after three bloody years of war, the minority is permitted to rule. . . . Federation can only take place between free peoples," should be content with only an extended form of autonomy, and that in this veiled manner he meant to discourage their efforts to secure liberation, would be doing the President an injustice.

There is yet a third interpretation of this sentence. That is to the effect that from the American standpoint our government is not going to insist on any rearrangements in the map of Europe as such. As Americans we are not interested in any future political rearrangements only in so far as these rearrangements will be necessary to assure a future world peace. Consequently we stand on the ground that the people of Austria-Hungary themselves must determine whether in the future they shall continue under the sway of the House of Hapsburg or whether they will themselves break away and establish that form of government which alone will be acceptable to themselves. We are not fighting for the purpose of dismembering the Austro-Hungarian empire and for the purpose of placing in its stead a series of independent states. Neither, on the other side, are we going to stand in the path of the legitimate aspirations of these people, or hamper them in the course which they have adopted. President Wilson has made it clear that the world must be made safe for democracy. That makes it necessary that each nation shall have an opportunity to determine its own fate, and it would be rank folly to presume that of all the countries that are now engaged in the war America would be the one to deny to the people of Austria-Hungary the right of self-determination.

G. H. Mika.

New York City.

Decentralized Housing

SIR: Your editorials, comments and communications regarding the war housing crisis are so timely and far-sighted in their scope that I hesitate to offer any criticism, but the editorial of December 22nd emphasizes one view of the attitude which seems to me wrong, in the light of the experience here and elsewhere. The suggestion is made that there should be an emergency housing corporation with one man alone at the head of it, and when such a corporation is established every new war housing project in the country should be financed, designed and supervised by it. The country is now suffering acutely from the very policy which is here proposed. The construction of the army cantonments, the manufacture of munitions and supplies, the manufacture of ships, even to the enlisting and classifying of the drafted men have been directly managed in each case by one head. There are those who believe it would have been far wiser had the apparent policy of the present administration been varied, and some safety sought in at least a conference of experts and in a dividing up of the actual work to be done rather than in a concentration of authority.

It is my conviction that the housing demands would be met in a far better and more permanent manner if each division of the country were encouraged to work out its own ideas, and were given pretty free authority to do so, rather than to have each center held back waiting for orders from Washington, as it does now in food and fuel conservation and in nearly every activity of the government. We need a greater development of individual initiative and a greater freedom of local option, and to undertake to have one corporation which would finance, design and supervise all the housing work of this country would be simply to invite a repetition of the exasperating delays due to the many efforts during the last twelve months to produce results by a centralization of authority and ignoring of local freedom of initiative. By all means let the government get busy, and if the government really means to aid in the housing development let it carry out at once a program of furnishing the backing and the capital necessary for properly accredited local organizations to take up and solve for their own locations in their own way the problems which they themselves are better able to carry out and judge of than any body of men, and especially than any one man who would undertake in Washington to determine the needs of the whole country.

C. H. Blackall.

Boston, Massachusetts.

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At the Capitol

Fifty Million Horsepower

THERE is pending before the House of Representatives one of the most unnecessarily prodigal bills which that body has ever considered. It has been passed by the Senate. It will receive the early attention of the House. And though it now masquerades as a war measure, and is presumably brought forward in answer to the President's call for an immediate development of our national resources, it is easily recognized as the Shields waterpower bill, not greatly changed from the form in which the House defeated it, a year and a half ago. Its chances in the present instance are no doubt improved by its new status as a weapon against Germany.

Advocates of the Shields bill have on many occasions supported it by pointing out that more than fifty million horsepower goes to waste annually on the rivers of this country. They quote statistics to show how this power, harnessed to dynamos, would heat the homes of twenty American cities and have current enough left to illumine lights running in various circumferences from Bangor, Maine, to Singapore. And with their conclusion that the waterpower of the country invites development there can be no quarrel. No proof is needed to show that in war time or peace time an addition of fifty million horsepower would add to American resources.

It is nevertheless misleading to think of "development" as any creditable end in itself. Undeveloped waterpower may indeed be capable of supplying light all the way to Singapore. But of what possible interest can this be to the ordinary citizen, part owner of the undeveloped horsepower, unless it will also supply light in his own home at a lower rate than he has paid in the past? Development is an empty term if it has not this significance.

Development, accordingly, means not only the presentation of an opportunity to investors but also the guaranty that there will be no extortionate rates levied upon the public. The Shields waterpower bill fails to provide for any sort of governmental renting charge to be revalued at frequent intervals, and to be based upon the waterpower available and its relation to the rate charged for electricity. It leaves the question of rates altogether to the uncertainties of a state control which must face the influence of powerful national and international corporations. Local agencies doubtless deserve a share in regulatory powers over rates. But where a national interest is so intimately concerned as it would be in the manipulation of fifty million horsepower, it is shortsighted to deny the national government some partnership in the control of rates. The copper mines of Arizona and the iron range of northern Minnesota offer evidence of how completely the giant organizations which own the sources of wealth also own the local agencies of public opinion.

What seems a similarly unnecessary precaution against hurting private business interests is the provisions which the Shields bill sets up for the recapture of waterpower sites by the government. It is quite possible that at some future day the American people will decide to develop their own waterpower sites, or see them developed by other agencies than those originally granted charters.

For such a contingency the Shields bill makes poor provision. Some payment to the investors who are surrendering a property is of course obligatory. The corporations that put money into the improvement of a site are entitled to get it out again, at a fair profit. But suppose that after using public waterpower for fifty years a company has earned enough to reward the capital invested—and simultaneously to set aside an amortization fund that would reimburse the investors for the total amount they had put into the enterprise. Surely in such case the public should be given back its waterpower site without being compelled to purchase it. For the investors would not only have been adequately rewarded from year to year, but they would have collected—from this same public— a sum that represented the value of the property they now held. Yet for such a case, a case certain to be the prevailing one, the Shields bill makes no provision. Its scheme of waterpower development proposes, in this instance, to make the public pay twice for improvements on its own waterpower sites.

Assume, however, that paying twice for improvements is a shrewd bargain for the public to drive. What, then, shall the public pay? The bill says "just compensation." And if it is necessary to pay any amount, "just compensation" would strike the ordinary person as being the right one. But the bill goes on. Together, it says, with compensation for all the property of the grantee "dependent in whole or in part" upon the waterpower site for its "usefulness." That may mean a street-car system and it may mean a moving-picture show and it may mean anything else which wouldn't be "useful" if the waterpower site weren't there. Nor is this the end. The public must also assume "all contracts entered into by the grantee" with the consent of the local governing agency. And if the public objects to assuming such contracts because they are unfair to its interests, then the parties to the contract may carry the issue into the courts of equity. A tangle of litigation is certain to be the result of these obligations that must be taken over in addition to "just compensation." Particularly will this be the case because the public must pay for improvements made by the grantee—not upon a basis of the value of the improvements when they actually become public property, but on the basis of their value when first constructed. Compensation for the actual physical value of the property at the time of its recapture is the most the public should be asked to pay—if it is to pay anything at all to investors who have already recovered their principal. To demand that the public pay what may be an unreal value for improvements, and assume contracts not certain to favor its interests, is to surround the process of recapture with conditions that will discourage its ever coming off.

The passage by the Senate of a bill carrying no more reassuring safeguards than these seems due to an ailment which is frequently responsible for legislative breakdowns: the lack of a responsible understanding between the administration and Congress. It seems clear that the administration intended to support the President's recommendation for immediate waterpower legislation with a bill better drawn to protect the public's interest. But these are war times, and department chiefs are busy with the detail of additional administrative work. And, in the meantime, there was Senator Shields. For three years Senator Shields has fought the administration's waterpower policy, and simultaneously—by virtue of our custom of permitting political old age to select our Congressional chairmen—has remained leader for the administration in that field in which he fought it. In the present instance, Mr. Shields doubtless saw an opportunity to take his bill from the pigeon-hole in which it has profitably lain for the past year and a half. And the Senate, in which the conservation group is never a majority, approved it. When it comes the House's turn to act, the public deserves to see greater pressure exerted by the administration in favor of a modified measure. C. M.

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Books and Things

ALTHOUGH my ulster was what we used to call worn out, being a little ragged in spots and more than a little threadbare, and although it was almost ten years old, I did not easily bring myself to buy a new one. I was held back by pictures of the other things that could be bought for the same money, and of the men who needed these things. Nor was I quite uninfluenced by that decent respect for the opinions of mankind which some of us call fear. Several ready-made shops did I visit, trying on before mirrors of heroic size, conscientiously feeling different cloths, behaving in general like a man who thinks to hide his ignorance of wine by holding his glass of sherry against the light, testingly. Having thus persuaded myself, much of course against my will, that the better article is always cheaper than the cheaper, I went to my tailor's with a conscience nearly in the place where I had been trying to put it.

Nearly, but not quite. The new ulster has a more "conspicuous plainness" than most of the clothes I buy when nobody gives me sobering advice. It looks a little, now when I survey it with an unimpassioned eye, like a garment chosen by one who wished to escape notice. Now and then, wearing it carelessly before friends whom I judge to be good judges of such things, I have caught myself wondering whether the degree to which it has failed to attract their attention were not excessive. One of them, I am bound to say, did give that ulster the praise it deserves. Then he paused for a minute, appeared to calculate, and added: "It ought to last you half the rest of your life."

True, perhaps, but what is the use of reminding a man that he is mortal by such concrete illustrations? Their convincingness is their offense. If a friend must tell me that I am to die, if he cannot be happy until he has got this truth off his chest, let him say it in a jargon of abstract words, like senescence. Why poison my mind against a worthy ulster, which for days I shall not put on without reflecting that if you measure its length of life by that of its predecessors, and my length of life by that of mine, the next ulster I buy will probably be my last? In Paris once, years ago now, I came suddenly on a shop which sold dix mille chemises. The thought that I could not live to wear so many made mortality seem real.

What would my conduct be, I wonder, if in truth, and say for a week on end, I did imagine myself part of this earth's perishable freight? Set my house in order? Try to remember where I put my will? Number my days so that I might apply my heart unto wisdom? Of course, of course. But what else? "What," said Samuel Johnson, upon one of the many occasions when he thought of death, "what must be the condition of him whose heart will not suffer him to rank himself among the best, or among the good? Such must be his dread of the approaching trial, as will leave him little attention to the opinion of those whom he is leaving forever." I do not believe I should partake of this feeling. The opinion of those whom I was leaving forever would matter a good deal. In one's last week on earth it would be pleasant to do something, not melodramatic or obviously staged, which would round off one's life with a quietly noble gesture, stop on the right note, look handsome in retrospect, be not misplaced on the front page. In practice, such gestures being difficult, I should doubtless content myself with removing one or two objects from my effects. This book, for example, in which I have written so many words, this must not fall under the eyes of my heirs. They would not read it, that is more than probable, but certainly they will not if I commit it, thus, to the flames. . . . There! . . . That is done. . . . It burns . . . it is gone.

It was far from a "roguish" book, of the kind which Mr. Samuel Pepys burned now and then, lest it be found in his library to shame him. It was only a blank book in which I had built, line upon line, page upon page, a monument to my unwisdom. There I had set down, beginning with August, 1914, what I believed about the war. I believed that the Germans would be brought to a standstill somewhere in Belgium, that by their continued attacks in mass formation they proved how little they had learned since 1871 about the art of war, that the German navy would be destroyed before August, 1915, that the strength of the Russian army would bear against Germany with ever increasing weight, that the entrance of Rumania into the war would shorten it, that England had got the submarines under control. These and other opinions did I write down, and nearly every one of them wrong.

The men who are running the war, who have to judge probability and to make decisions, these need all possible confidence in themselves. But I wish that everybody who does nothing for the war or to the war except to talk about it, and whose self-confidence needs impairment, had kept a book like mine and were forced to reread it at short intervals. Alike from one's obvious mistakes and from one's monotonous consistency something might be learned, some self-distrust acquired. Early in the war my cousin Isabel became convinced that the Germans had committed atrocities. The war has convinced her of nothing else. She has been consistent, stationary, unexperiencing.

Which minds have learned least in the last four years, from the war, those which still feed on atrocities and give eager credence to every spy story, or those whose attitude was fixed once for all by their reaction against the romantic illusion about war? For them the details of a soldier's life have an unchanging fascination. Their attention is fixed upon the cold, the ruin, the mud, the vermin, the stenches. They see war as a field of putrid flesh, hear it as shrieks of agony, feel it as the human body into which a bayonet crashes or slips. They forget that the widespread, the almost universal courage which endures these things is greater than it would need to be if war were all glory and romance. The worse war is, the more horrible and futile, the more miraculous that greatness of spirit which has fought and fights on.

Meanwhile I notice, in my friends and in myself, a feeling which is of no value to anybody, and which does not change except to grow deeper and to displace other feelings. Here we all are, safe, middle-aged, warmed, fed, clothed, harmlessly occupied. And over there the better bodies and better brains of younger men are being destroyed scientifically, day by day, at a rate that can almost be predicted. This contrast is already old, but always new to feel, week by week more unbearable, unthinkable. Our feeling is more presentable than my cousin Isabel's monomania, but not more useful. In my case it produces only silly self-deceptions before spending money on myself. For I still believe I should not have bought that new overcoat if I hadn't lost the old one.

P. L.

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Correctness

On Contemporary Literature, by Stuart P. Sherman. New York: Henry Holt & Co. $1.50.

TO the readers of The New York Nation Mr. Sherman's name is familiar as one of the few critics in the country. The articles in this volume have all appeared in The Nation, contributed from the professorial realm of Urbana, Illinois. How Urbana manages to keep Mr. Sherman is an academic mystery; but now that he has shown the amazing difference between words printed in a periodical and words collected in a book, the eyes of university trustees elsewhere ought to be wheeled upon him, and Urbana compelled to guard or to yield. Certainly few American university trustees can know their own business if they neglect a professor who does so well the thing that they most admire.

The essence of Mr. Sherman's criticism is American correctness, that bloodless correctness to which New England has given its wintry favor. Mr. Sherman is himself an Iowan, but he breathes New England and there is nothing of Iowa about him. He is a man of mind, grave, responsible and careful, never guilty of that exuberance which is so incompatible with a full considerateness, and determined not to bring forth any more ideas than he can perfectly pasteurize. But he is not wholly in a mould. An accomplished exponent of the native moralism, he does more than preserve his fine thin narrow preoccupation with righteousness. He insists on it, as part of a grand counter-revolution, not only in his peregrinations through the unwholesome modernists, but also through the vulgar democracy of Mark Twain, the continent art of Arnold Bennett, the tolerated liberalism of Anatole France, the sunken laughter of John Synge, the "æsthetic idealism" of Henry James, the "humanism" of George Meredith—until he relaxes cautiously in the end, safe in the arms of Shakespeare. It is correctness rampant that makes Mr. Sherman's crest different from the ordinary heraldry; and the main delectation of his book is its conservative call to arms.

What is the issue? To Mr. Sherman himself it seems that it is the same great issue which underlies the war. If we are fighting the Germans because they have broken treaties and scouted honor and disregarded humanity, then we must also repudiate and cast out those mechanistic, monistic, scientific "naturalists" who have the same immorality as the Germans. The dragon of naturalism has drawn his filthy trail across our literature. We must slay the dragon. H. G. Wells, Theodore Dreiser, George Moore, even John Dewey, do not recognize certain rights and principles, but "humanity does after all recognize certain rights and principles as fixed and established," and therefore, by St. George, we must draw the shining sword. As Mr. Sherman sums it up, "the victory of the Allies should logically be reflected in a literature exalting the vindicated 'law for man.' Haunted by memories of the fiery ruin wrought by those who made lust and law alike in their decree, it should not seek in nature for the order, stability, justice, gentleness, and wisdom that only man has ever desired or sought to create. It should mirror a society more regardful of its ascertained values, more reverent of its fine traditions, more reluctant to take up with the notions of windy innovators. It should, in short, suggest in its own subtle way the desirability of continuing to work out in the world that ideal pattern which lies in the instructed and disciplined heart."

This, we may take it, is a cri de coeur. Literature has suffered from the libertines, and literature, "in its own subtle way," must make amends by lifting us to a higher plane. As against the practices of those naturalists who would bring us to the level of the Germans it must, in the end, edify.

One might linger among the details of Mr. Sherman's conservatism. If he is setting out to show that "the old moral abstractions" mean nothing to Germany, for example, he has his work cut out for him. The odium of scientific monism may be attached to certain ruthless Germans, especially German legalists, but you cannot start out to annex such a convenient equipment as the old moral abstractions without hearing a loud squawk from the Kaiser. The trouble is, Mr. Sherman's counter-revolution has in it a preposterous amount of that German specialty, "instinctive obedience"; and, as he says himself, "we have trusted our instincts long enough to sound the depths of their treacherousness." But the fact that German junkers hate "windy innovators" quite as much as Mr. Sherman does, and that official Germany equally adores the "ideal pattern," does not go to the heart of the matter. The heart of the matter, so far as understanding Mr. Sherman is concerned, does seem to be in recognizing his profound conviction that life is in no sense an experiment, is in reality an ingenious examination paper set by God in conjunction with Matthew Arnold. "Stemming the tide of natural impulse"—that is one great way to reach the right solution. Also believing that "society is in great part an organized opposition to nature." The high principle is, Arthurian self-control.

It is a permanent question, this one of the libertinism of all radicals, the morality of all stand-patters. But where G. K. Chesterton has proved himself an artist in the ways of counter-revolution is in his public espousal of beer. By establishing his relationship with Falstaff, by talking like an obstreperous brewery-drayman, Mr. Chesterton has left no doubt that when he says "restraint" there is actually something to restrain. If Mr. Chesterton were to say, "It is of the essence of a man to lay down his life out of reverence for his great-grandfather," you would feel that he is incurably romantic and would hope that his wife and family could keep him from being hurt. But when Mr. Sherman says it, and he does say it, you feel not altogether serious. No one ought to have a great-grandfather fit to mention in either Iowa or Illinois. And when Mr. Sherman talks of restraint, you contemplate his one terrific outburst of violence, "If I may be pardoned a violent expression, Mr. Wells would like to slay all the Victorians." Restraint, on these pure lips, implies something that the intoxicated Gilbert did not intend. You feel at once that it is something *you* have, not something he himself has, that Mr. Sherman wants to restrain. Yours, of course, is the tide of natural impulse that he is longing to stem.

And so we find it. He admires Mark Twain, feels like explaining the great barbarian to the "saving remnant," rejoices in his "domestic rectitude and common morality," but he is queasy about Mark Twain's "savory earthiness," "golden mediocrities," "undisciplined strength." He sees Mark Twain as reckless, prodigal, garrulous, uproarious, naïve, homely, arrogantly candid, impudent, not fine, not profound, "not a drop of the aristocrat in his veins." He yearns in connection with Mark Twain toward "the discipline of an older and firmly stratified society." It may not seem a grudging reference, but the fact that Mark Twain ridiculed pure art like Jane Austen and The Vicar of Wakefield sticks endlessly in his teacher's crop, and he actually dares to dismiss masterpieces like Tom Saw-

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yer and Huckleberry Finn as "almost entirely delightful."

It is the intimidation of another positive vitality that impairs H. G. Wells for Mr. Sherman. He likens Wells to Rousseau, to the godless Shelley. He blames him for irregularity. He calls him a "zoological moralist" because Wells does not see that "in the course of some thousands of years of civilized society the elementary principles of conduct have been adequately tested, and are now to be unequivocally accepted. They constitute a standard of 'right reason' outside themselves, to which we should vigorously subject our treacherous individual sensibilities." And, if you please, Mr. Sherman recalls the cant that training in the sciences leaves "the moral nature undisciplined and inclined to caprice and eccentricity," as if Darwin, Huxley, Lyell, Tyndall, had not shown the world, precisely in the sphere of moral nature, what magnificent beings English scientists could be. This miserable little slander is on a par with identifying H. G. Wells's advocacy of "efficiency" with the Belgic "efficiency" of Germany, classing Mr. Wells with ruthless "imperially-minded men." You might as well say that Benjamin Franklin was a Prussian because he favored punctuality, or that Mrs. Bill Jones is a materialist because she employs a carpet-sweeper. And, indeed, when one explores the prejudice against "naturalism," when one sees the humble pot-boilers of Arnold Bennett hailed as rare sanity and sobriety, there is almost no argument that does not seem possible in this battle against fearful odds.

But the supreme perversion in Mr. Sherman's book is too full of savory heavenliness not to be quoted. It is his exhibit in the case of The Brook Kerith's indecency.

"It is shortly after the descent from the cross and during the convalescence that the following conversation takes place:

> "'Joseph asked, not because he was interested in dog breeding, but to make talk, if the puppies were mongrels. Mongrels, Jesus repeated overlooking them; not altogether mongrels, three-quarter bred; the dog that begot them was a mongrel, half-Syrian, half Tracian. I've seen worse dogs highly prized. Send the bitch to a dog of pure Tracian stock and thou'lt get some puppies that will be the sort that I used to seek.'

"This is not the most nor the least quotable of the innumerable passages by which our ingenious author gives to his narrative a kind of sex-interest in which the gospel story is quite deficient."

A clearer example of pruriency it would be hard to find. "We of the English race," as Mr. Sherman puts it, may be quite right to "resist Moore—though he is a pretty writer—to save Shakespeare, whom, on the whole, year in and year out, we prefer." But granted that there is a sinister movement on foot to dethrone Shakespeare in favor of George Moore, and that Moore ought to be heroically resisted by "us of the English race," still when Moore wanted to refer to sex he never did fall back on so quaint a subterfuge as hinting that Jesus knew a little about breeding dogs.

As between low vitality and high vitality there is no reason why high vitality should be a bully's. H. G. Wells and Theodore Dreiser are by no means exquisitely sensitive to the rights that they depict as betrayed. But this business of "stemming the tide of natural impulse" converts a critic into a nursery-maid, and puts men of genius in a perambulator that is several sizes too small. Mr. Sherman calls himself a humanist. He thinks Mr. Wells is a dangerous faun and Mr. Dreiser a satyr and Mr. Moore a half-animal of obscene ways. But what he really resents in these men is their irregular insistence on "treacherous individual sensibilities." They have disregarded what he considers "the first duty of man, which is to perpetuate in and through himself the moral life of the race."

Is the criterion of that moral life to be Mr. Sherman's correctness, and is any such correctness the proper touchstone of art? Not even his measured praise of George Meredith and his sensitive appreciation of Henry James can buttress such egregious rules. It might be an excellent thing for the United States if a clear division were made between the sheep and the goats of criticism. On the side of the sheep, as Mr. Sherman sees it, there would be a collection of eminent names—Paul Elmer More, W. C. Brownell, Professor Babbitt; and, I suppose, Brander Matthews, Barrett Wendell and Paul Shorey. But before this division can be accepted, with all the eternal verities falling on the side of the sheep, Mr. Sherman must do better in the way of an offensive than disapproving of contemporary vitality. When Shakespeare was contemporary, the mandarins frowned on him. When George Meredith first appeared he was hounded. It took Mark Twain a generation to get the slightest professorial recognition. With such examples of timidity, why counsel timidity? Mr. Sherman preaches a forlorn gospel when he begs us to cower behind the moral life of the race to peer at art.

F. H.

Light on Trade Unionism

Trade Unionism in the United States, by Robert F. Hoxie. New York: D. Appleton & Co. $2.50.

As a rule posthumous publications are likely to interest the general reader in only a limited degree. The fact that the author withheld a part of his writings from publication indicates that in his judgment they were immature or incomplete, or not of such a character as to offer a strong appeal to the public. But this rule does not apply to the writings of Professor Hoxie that have appeared since his death. He was not a professional writer, but a scholar and an educator engrossed in scientific investigation and in the training of other men. Thus it happened that he kept about him, in the form of lecture notes, written memoranda and reprints of special articles, materials that any professional writer would eagerly have put together and published as books. The book we have before us represents a part of this hidden treasure. The work of placing the material in order has been executed by the author's wife and one of his students, Mr. Nathan Fine, with the assistance, on many special points, of other students trained under Professor Hoxie. The compilation has been so skilfully done that one can scarcely believe that the work was not left by its author in the condition of an organic whole. As it stands it is not merely a good book; it is, by the consent of critics of widely different schools, the best book we have on trade unionism in America. And it will be long before we have a better book to supersede it. For the qualities that distinguish Hoxie's work are exceedingly rare in scholarship. Where other scholars strive earnestly to deal in certitudes, it was Hoxie's zeal to preserve an open mind. His devotion to openmindedness is infectious. No one can read this book without experiencing a reaction against the dogmatism that closes so many avenues of interest that "the truth about trade unionism" appears capable of statement in a few high-sounding "principles."

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Is trade unionism a healthy, democratic movement or is it a baneful manifestation of the spirit of monopoly or of the mob? If you will endeavor to find out what trade unionism really is, Hoxie demonstrates, you will be incapable of asking such a question. "Unionism is in essence one of the most complex, diffuse and protean of modern social phenomena. . . . What is true of one union or group may not be at all true of another. No judgments may be rendered nor generalizations made in regard to unionism as such from the study of any union or any small number of unions or any group. And, moreover, in the realm of unionism, everything is in a state of flux, of constant change and development."

It is not merely that unions differ so widely in structure and function that all generalizations about them are necessarily misleading. The sources of information are notoriously biased; indeed, they are as often as not deliberately intended to convey false impressions. What particular unions are driving at one should be able to ascertain at first hand if he could gain the confidence of honest members, one would suppose. No: the union membership consists of men specialized to labor, not to philosophizing; for the most part they can give only hazy accounts of their objects and actions. These seem to be difficulties enough to discourage the investigator, but he has a still more serious difficulty to overcome: his own bias. How shall one strip his thinking of the unconscious influence of his social environment, of the accepted tradition, as he must if he would judge dispassionately of a new social phenomenon, growing up in despite of the traditional social order?

As to the first difficulty, Hoxie surmounted it through a ten years' study of every kind of evidence he could lay hands on. His extraordinarily active mind was relentlessly at work collecting information, sifting, classifying, with the object of reducing union manifestations to type forms comprehensible in science. He never arrived at results that satisfied him, but they are far enough in advance of those that the rest of us are likely to arrive at to satisfy us. As to the difficulty of securing trustworthy evidence, Hoxie's solution was laborious, but worth emulating. First make up your mind thoroughly what you want to know, and why. With your mind definitely fixed on what you want to get out of a possible informant, you will probably get it. This will explain the importance Hoxie attached to his elaborate questionnaires, of which a remarkable specimen was published in his earlier work, Scientific Management and Labor. More light on this aspect of Hoxie's method is thrown by references scattered through the present work, and especially by the two appendices.

This emphasis upon a preliminary determination of what you are trying to find out, and why, is unusual in economic inquiry, where without the expense of thinking you can learn from your revered master exactly how to organize a piece of work to be executed in his field. And your master learned from his master the secret of organizing the work. That is, we all work within the limits of a tradition, a tradition, be it conceded, that has proved its worth by survival. No one can afford to drive recklessly beyond the bounds set by tradition in any of the pure sciences: more sheer ability has been invested in them than any upstart can command. But in trade unionism we are dealing with something defiant of scientific tradition. Handling it according to the spirit of the masters of political economy brought trivial or purely negative results. Hoxie's orders to those enlisted under his banner were to scatter and use their heads—manifestly, when one thinks of it, the only proper orders for this difficult terrain.

To escape from personal and class bias was for Hoxie himself a relatively easy matter. He was congenitally democratic, with an unavowed premise that every human being has something to say for himself worth a wise man's hearing. To the mind of a real democrat no human act is sufficiently disposed of by a judgment of good or evil, wisdom or foolishness. If in the pursuit of his inquiries Hoxie found himself in the thick of a labor struggle and felt the weight of the union slugger's arm, he did not content himself with maledictions upon labor violence, but set himself to learn the philosophy of violence. There is really a philosophy of slugging, as of everything else men do in mass. And it is interesting; besides we are more likely to get rid of the reprehensible acts if we understand the philosophy. There is also a philosophy underlying many of the acts that most of us consider not only lawful, but morally meritorious and socially expedient, but that seem to various kinds of trade unionists oppressive and iniquitous to the last degree. The law itself, now: that is fair to all, is it not? If you think so, read Hoxie's chapter on it. You will still doubtless be for the law, but you will understand better the attitude labor often takes toward it. Existing law is the embodiment of one philosophy of life, a middle class philosophy. Labor is working out another philosophy of life. The laborer's conception of right locks horns with yours: labor is therefore the law-breaker. Labor is the law-breaker, for the present; as to the future, who knows what philosophies will prevail?

A man who does not dogmatize, who considers every kind of man worth while, every philosophy of life worth dispassionate examination, runs terrible risks of dispersing himself into a Nirvana of supine tolerance. Only persistent energy can save him. Hoxie was persistently energetic. He succeeded in winning for himself a plan of action. We cannot have absolute standards of right and justice in the conflict between labor and capital. We cannot, by some reconstitution of social relations, eliminate conflict of interest and clash of principles. We can have a thoroughly informed social mind, a social will incorporated in flexible and intelligent organs of administration, to arbitrate between conflicting interests and to compromise contradictory conceptions of right and justice. We can have a social system developing, not as now with the infinite waste of physical conflict, but in an orderly manner, directed by reason. This we can have, but only on condition that we learn the lesson of humility, inquiring persistently, condemning or approving slowly, and then only after making sure that we have corrected the personal or class bias with which we are all afflicted.

ALVIN JOHNSON.

Sir Charles Dilke

The Life of Sir Charles Dilke, by Stephen Gwynn and Gertrude Tuckwell. New York: The Macmillan Company. $10.

THERE has been no English political biography so valuable as this since Lord Morley summarized an epoch in his life of Gladstone. Mr. Trevelyan's Bright is a more striking picture. Mr. Churchill's defense of his father is more brilliant. Lord Fitzmaurice's account of Earl Granville brings us nearer to the mysteries of diplomatic power. But all of them are to some extent defenses. None of them, consequently, brings us so near to the in-

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stitutional functions by which his subject was moulded. None of them, therefore, so intimately and honestly reveals the fundamental structure of English politics. Here is a clear picture of the world from which Mr. Bagehot derived his sparkling generalizations. The character of aristocratic power, the tinsel which still pathetically clings to kingship, the moral enigma of Mr. Gladstone—these are here posed again with new material for their solution, in a work that contributes greatly to the full comprehension of our time.

If Sir Charles Dilke did not have a career of the first importance, that is not to be ascribed to his fault. He had the ability, he had the will and he had the knowledge. These volumes are an impressive commentary upon the exactions true parliamentary eminence demands. You see Dilke familiarizing himself with the elaborate and technical details of the procedure of the House, annotating his blue books, writing a dozen letters and seeing half-a-dozen people to clear up a single point. He was an ideal administrator at the Local Government Board. If he lacked Granville's suppleness at the Foreign Office, he had a grasp of the questions involved and an eager liberalism in handling them that Granville certainly never possessed. He understood army and naval problems as one supposes not half a dozen civilians outside Lord Haldane and Lord Esher have ever done. He realized the democratic significance of Russia half a century before his time. He grasped the virtues of an Anglo-French entente while Disraeli was letting himself be duped at Berlin. He was friendly with Gambetta at a time when the possession of such friendships was almost tantamount to preserving the peace of Europe. He knew every one of his contemporaries who was in any way worth acquaintance, and he seems to have learned from them all.

A wealthy man, with half the important doors of London open to him, he yet slaved at his books with all the eagerness of one who has the fundamental passion of politics; nor did he abate a jot of his convictions that his advancement might be secure. "Citizen Dilke" the quidnuncs called him, and it was "Citizen Dilke" he remained to the end. Never a first-rate speaker, in the sense that Gladstone and Bright were first-rate in one class, and Disraeli first-rate in another, he yet always spoke with a grasp of his materials and a depth of conviction which gave him not less command over a popular audience than he possessed over the House of Commons. He realized the first great truth of political controversy—that a man with a cause to plead need never talk down to his audience. He always had a belief in the principles your democrat must accept—universal suffrage, economic justice, the fair treatment of the backward races, the independence of women. But he was not merely content with the enunciation of principles. He lived his life for their translation into practice. It was his attack on the Civil List in the late seventies which prevented an unnecessary extension of royal influence in England, with a recurrence of the corruption of the Georgian court as a contingency. He paid for his beliefs. Queen Victoria fought hard against his admission to the cabinet, and one imagines that she was not unconnected with his later exclusion from his office after his vindication. His work on the Redistribution Bill of 1885 prepared the way for the Liberal triumph of 1906. He slaved like a schoolboy over labor legislation. Session after session he brought forward a bill for the regulation of the mines until his reiteration drew from a weary government the Royal Commission that turned private bill into public statute. He and Lady Dilke were the presiding geniuses of the Women's Trade Union League, and it is only in the light of the last three years that the significance of that effort can be understood. He was among the first to seize the broadening import of the English colonies, and without question the first to divert imperialism into such liberal channels as it is slowly finding. He had a fine and healthy suspicion of National Insurance on the paternalist model, realizing with perfect clarity the danger inherent in the bureaucratic state. From 1896 until 1909 he fought nobly for the improvement of shop conditions. He was the first minister to appoint women inspectors to the Local Government Board; and it was not until twelve years later that Mr. Asquith, then Home Secretary, followed the precedent Dilke had vainly urged upon that stout antiquary, Sir William Harcourt. And, above all, he gave devoted and unstinting service to the cause of unskilled labor.

It is a noble record as it is a tragic one. There are few things more difficult to understand than the virtual exclusion of Dilke from politics by Mr. Gladstone. He (Dilke, not Gladstone) had been charged with adultery by a jealous woman; and trial no less than private rumor had completely acquitted him from the charge. Given the attitude of public sentiment to private misdemeanor his temporary retirement is intelligible. But once he had been cleared, it is little less than tragedy that the one English political figure of the eighties who had the ability and the knowledge to shape the forces of English liberalism to the ends which, twenty-five years later, they were destined to serve, should have been shelved either because Mr. Gladstone was a high churchman or because he had not the courage to resist the Queen. Dilke would have made an admirable leader. If he had stayed, the course of English politics might have been very different. Mr. Chamberlain might not have left the Liberal party, and the tragedies of the South African period might have been averted. If he had stayed, the social problem would have become prominent in English politics at least ten years before it did. As it was, action came from men who did not understand, as Dilke understood, how largely obsolete was the effort to make party capital out of such questions. The Home Rule question of Mr. Gladstone's time was, as we see now, and as Dilke saw then, very largely one huge mistake. Conservative opposition did not come so much from conviction as from indignation that Mr. Gladstone had won Irish support in advance of themselves. If Mr. Gladstone had had Dilke by his side the situation would have been different. Irish self-government would have been a universal effort of Englishmen after justice. Chamberlain would not have gone; and Chamberlain would have been saved simply by Dilke's ingenuity in following the tortuous labyrinth of Mr. Gladstone's mind. The Duke of Devonshire might have stayed; for if ever a man was tortured into alien conviction by errors of terminology and vagueness of purpose, the Duke of Devonshire was that man. The generation that succeeded Dilke and Chamberlain, Lord Morley, Mr. Asquith, Lord Bryce, could not speak with the same authority; and what was then merely a variation upon the consequences of an agrarian theme, became linked, through the poison of party, with the most distorted of religious and secular passions. Mr. Gladstone had doubtless a splendid love of liberty; but he used strange methods to secure its triumph.

Dilke's life admirably illustrates the change that is taking place in the House of Commons. Few men give there today the disinterested service that he gave. No one is so careful to watch the progress of debate. Deputations, letters to the Times, public meetings, have ceased to possess

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their earlier importance. The House of Commons has passed under the control of the executive power, and it has ceased to influence in the measure that it has ceased to be independent. His diaries contain, as I think, the real secret of this change. The critical epoch in the modern history of the House of Commons was concentrated in the three or four years of the eighties in which Mr. Schnadhorst was elaborating the mechanics of the caucus. Once that had been perfected, the complete centralization of party allegiance followed. Those became completely paramount who controlled the machine; and independence met with exclusion. In the days when Dilke was making his reputation, the position was far different. The Central Liberal Office, so far as it existed, could no more have stimulated the Liberals of Chelsea to refuse him their support than they could have kept Mr. Gladstone permanently quiet in one of his periodical retirements. No one in that time would have dared to treat the spurious radicalism of Lord Randolph Churchill or the eager democracy of Dilke with the flippant contempt that characterizes, for instance, Lord Robert Cecil's treatment of the ideas of Mr. Philip Snowden or Mr. Charles Trevelyan. The modern party has become the idol that Halifax feared three centuries ago—"ignorance maketh most men go into a party, and shame keepeth them from getting out of it." Whether we shall follow him in his view that "the best party is but a kind of conspiracy against the rest of the nation" is largely a matter of the way in which we believe in representative government. Certainly the group system of France affords no greater benefit than the two party methods. It is the old difficulty of at once maintaining order and liberty.

There is one aspect of this book that has a particular importance at the present time. No one can read its chapters on foreign affairs without perceiving the vast influence Dilke was able to exert simply from his knowledge of and friendship with statesmen outside his own country. Nor can one belittle the importance of the temperament of statesmen. It made a vast difference to Europe that his favorite friend should have been Gambetta. The history of the Triple Alliance might have been different if Lord Salisbury had not forgotten Corti, the Italian ambassador to Constantinople, at the Congress of Berlin. One gets from these pages a wearying sense of the infinite and subtle considerations that the modern diplomatic system involves. The problem of ambassadorial appointment gets complicated by the wishes of the Queen. Freycinet negotiates with Rome behind the backs of his colleagues. The eastern question resolves itself into a gloomy discussion of Harcourt's eagerness not to be snubbed. The French attitude to Turkey is in confusion because the French foreign minister is busy purging his office of clericals and reactionaries. England has to modify her liberalism because Bismarck grows jealous of her position in Europe. No one denies the stupidity of easy talk against the processes of diplomacy. But this book reveals clearly what is suggested by every similar biography, that the lives of men and women cannot be left to the accidental results of temperamental conflicts. It is not until a mechanism if not of prevention at least of delay, is interposed that safeguards against this danger will be adequate.

From whatever angle this life is regarded it is a valuable supplement to what we already possess. Those who have known Mr. Chamberlain in the evil days of protectionist imperialism can understand, when these volumes and the Recollections of Lord Morley are compared, how much he did to change the Whig into a liberal party. It is a mine of information about Mr. Gladstone, and refreshingly free from the fulsome eulogies of Lord Acton. It shows him as a man of dominating temperament, weak in dealing with men, obstinate in handling new ideas, a manipulator of policies rather than their creator, a great orator who needed to be great in order to convince himself. It has a perfect picture of Lord Randolph Churchill, the master sciolist of English politics. What it has to tell of Gambetta only deepens the convictions that other sources suggest—that France had no other man of his calibre since the Restoration, and that his policy in 1871 was throughout masterly. But, over all, it is the memory of Dilke that remains. It is the memory of a man who earnestly and unselfishly gave all of himself to the public service; of one who was never satisfied until he understood, and never content until perception was translated into the event. There were many men in the nineteenth century whom fortune permitted to play a greater part in the life of the state. Assuredly there were few so worthy of the highest place.

H. J. L.

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The Book of New York Verse, edited by Hamilton Fish Armstrong. Illustrated. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.

IN this most inclusive and heterogeneous collection of verses more or less closely inwoven with New York, every reader will find something to love; and every peruser will feel irked at the multiplicity and uneven worth of the 234 titles. On the whole, the first half of the book is

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vacant and dull, save where some modern writer on a Dutch or Revolutionary theme, or Walt Whitman with lusty indigenous breath, dispels the genteel dust. Until the modern renascence of poetry, our versifiers upon New York were indeed shadows of echoes: Whitman's revolt and his mission shine clearer in the reader's mind, as Drum-Taps shatter the reflective drowze of this book's nineteenth century pages. Of his young successor, James Oppenheim, equally redolent and interpretative of Manhattan, too little poetry is reprinted. There is also not a single Greenwich Village verse. But the anthology contains many well-known names—Markham, Van Dyke, Gilder, Moody, Mackaye, Torrance, Dana Burnet, and Robinson; poetesses, like Sara Teasdale, Margaret Widdemer, Florence Earle Coates, and Ruth Comfort Mitchell; radicals like Vachel Lindsay and Ezra Pound; and, of them all, most truly of New York, Don Marquis and "F.P.A." The husky volume is well illustrated with quaint or new artistic pictures. Had the selecting been more rigorous it would be a more pleasurable book.

Applied Psychology, by H. L. Hollingworth and A. T. Poffenberger, Jr. New York: D. Appleton & Co. $2.25.

"A MAN'S whole life consists in a process of adjustment to his environment, a series of responses to situations, of forms of behavior. To be a success or failure means to succeed or fail to adjust oneself to one's environment. A man who responds to the situations in which he is placed in a *normal* manner, or as other people do, is said to be sane: one who fails to adjust himself in this way is said to be insane or out of his mind." With this adequate equipment in the way of a philosophy of life, Messrs. Hollingworth and Poffenberger start their discussion. As an index of the views Columbia professors are permitted to hold, the doctrine is interesting, and ratifies the publisher's recommendation that the book "shows that an understanding of individual psychology is a very efficient instrument in producing success in life." There is little evidence that Messrs. Hollingworth and Poffenberger value highly any other kind than business success. We are rarely offered a more naïve revelation of psychological science serving as the handmaid of commercial exploitation. One-third of the book, it is true, is devoted to that "psychology" which is properly a branch of physiology,—the study of the effects of environmental conditions. But from this very superficial review of experiments we get little more than a conviction that, yes indeed, temperature and humidity, climate, illumination, rest, fatigue, sleep, drugs and stimulants, do affect human efficiency. We learn such interesting facts as that "Mr. Edison, who is said to require little sleep, also eats comparatively little food. He believes in a plain workingman's diet, and that the greatest economic gain for the world lies in the prevention of overeating." But he would be a wise reader who could work out from these chapters a technique of checking up his own individual reactions so that he might manipulate his environmental conditions in the most favorable way. Yet without such a technique it is frivolous to call psychology "applied."

The desire of the authors' hearts emerges in the later chapters, where we find psychology "applied" by the business man in office and workshop, in the selecting of employees, distributing their effort, organizing their movements, enticing the consumer, selling goods to people who do not want them. The psychologist is shown busily at work, perfecting a technique of exploitation, which may be then handed over to an employing class, for use in its interests as against those of worker and consumer. One may acquit these naïve Columbia instructors of any such sinister purpose, and still feel the danger that lies in an "applied" psychology like this of scientific management, advertising and salesmanship, which, under the disguise of impersonal science, contributes to class-manipulation. A really impersonal science would have to be developing simultaneously a technique of resistance for the manipulated classes. Messrs. Hollingworth and Poffenberger have nothing to offer here.

Most readers, however, will wish to complain about the book's superficiality. The chapter on "Psychology and Education" is so sweepingly uncritical in its discussion of the different scales and tests as to be misleading. The style of the book is journalistic to an extreme. It is books like this that give ammunition to the reactionary classicist who wants to fight every manifestation of the "new" education as "pseudo-science."

Contributors

to this issue

WILLIAM HARD is a writer on public affairs now investigating problems of organization in Washington for The New Republic.

R. MACG. DAWSON took the B. A. and M. A. degrees in economics and political science at Dalhousie University, Halifax, and an A. M. degree in government at Harvard University. He is a Canadian lawyer.

SIDNEY WEBB is a noted English economist, the author of numerous books, and the principal founder of the London School of Economics and Political Science.

ROBERT ANDERSON POPE is a New York architect who specializes in town planning and community design. He is a graduate of Harvard University.

PADRAIC COLUM is one of the younger Irish writers now in America. He is the author of Wild Earth, Mogu the Wanderer and other books.

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